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I.

INTRODUCTION

Special education, despite being a uniform federal mandate, is often
implemented drastically differently depending on the school system
delivering services, the particular category of disability, and the race or
ethnicity of students. 1 Affluent white children who attend well-managed
school districts tend to benefit from special education services. 2 In the underfunded and over-tasked districts where most minorities attend school, the
special education system does not always provide the same benefits.3 In these
schools, special education, too often, operates as a dumping ground for those
students the general education system cannot or refuses to serve. In these
instances, the label of “special education” may carry harms that outweigh its
benefits.4 For instance, African-American and American-Indian boys are the
most likely to be removed from the general education classroom, be educated
in more restrictive or separate environments, drop out of school, and be
tracked into lower achieving classes. 5 Consequently, they have the least
1.
MINORITY STUDENTS IN SPECIAL AND GIFTED EDUCATION 1 (M. Suzanne Donovan &
Christopher T. Cross eds., 2002) [hereinafter MINORITY STUDENTS]; Daniel J. Losen & Kevin G.
Welner, Disabling Discrimination in Our Public Schools: Comprehensive Legal Challenges to
Inappropriate and Inadequate Special Education Services for Minority Children, 36 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 407, 420 (2001).
2.
Daniela Caruso, Bargaining and Distribution in Special Education, 14 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 171, 174, 179 (2005) (arguing that parents with “financial and educational resources”
are likely to secure Individualized Educational Programs (IEPs) which are “better written . . .
contain more clearly measurable goals . . . and [are] more easily enforceable against noncompliant districts”).
3.
Robert Garda, The New IDEA: Shifting Educational Paradigms to Achieve Racial
Equality in Special Education, 56 ALA. L. REV. 1071, 1078 (2005); Theresa Glennon, Race,
Education, and the Construction of a Disabled Class, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1237, 1242.
4.
Glennon, supra note 3.
5.
PATTI RALABATE, NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, TRUTH IN LABELING: DISPROPORTIONALITY IN
SPECIAL EDUCATION 2 (2007), http://www.nea.org/assets/docs/HE/EW-TruthInLabeling.pdf.
Further, African American and American Indian boys with disabilities are the most likely to
receive out of school suspensions and are disciplined at higher rates than their non-disabled peers.
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION, DATA
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access to higher education and post-high school employment.6 In short,
special education does not appear to be helping many of these students
overcome the challenges they face, and it can sometimes make matters worse.
The overrepresentation of minorities in certain categories of disability is a
decades old problem. For more than thirty years, schools have struggled with
the accurate identification of disabilities for students of color.7 Without a
doubt, identifying the optimal level of special education is complex and
fraught with uncertainty. 8 But what seems relatively clear is that when
students are inaccurately identified as having disabilities—when in fact they
do not—the label and provision of special education services can cause
educational harm, particularly for minority students. As the National
Resource Council described:
[T]o be eligible for the additional resources a child must be labeled
as having a disability, a label that signals substandard performance.
And while that label is intended to bring additional supports, it may
also bring lowered expectations on the part of teachers, other
children, and the identified student. When a child cannot learn
without the additional support, and when the supports improve
outcomes for the child, that trade-off may well be worth making.
But because there is a trade-off, both the need and the benefit should
be established before the label and the cost are imposed.9

That calculus is complicated and varies for each child. For many students
the trade-offs are well worth it. But too often, schools provide what they
perceive to be the benefits of special education before making a careful,
unbiased evaluation to determine whether those “benefits” are truly needed
and whether they outweigh the costs. When special education is perceived by
teachers and schools as only a benefit, they may be too quick to label children
“disabled” resulting in more harm than good.
Despite the well documented problem of overrepresentation and its
accompanying harms, courts generally refuse to provide a remedy for
“misidentified” students.10 Thus, special education operates as a one-way
SNAPSHOT: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE (2014), http://ocrdata.ed.gov/Downloads/CRDC-SchoolDiscipline-Snapshot.pdf.
6.
RALABATE, supra note 5.
7.
See generally Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 973–74 (9th Cir. 1984).
8.
See generally Paul M. Secunda, “At Best an Inexact Science”: Delimiting the Legal
Contours of Specific Learning Disability Eligibility Under IDEA, 36 J.L. & EDUC. 155, 156–57
(2007).
9.
MINORITY STUDENTS, supra note 1, at 2–3.
10. See generally S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 251 (3d
Cir. 2013). The term “misidentified” as used in this article, is meant to describe those students
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street. Plaintiffs routinely sue schools to get more or better services, but when
a school implements services the child does not need or want, courts
disregard any educational harms suffered as a result of the erroneous label
and provision of services. This Article argues courts rejecting
misidentification claims do so under a misguided analysis. Misidentified
students have valid claims for relief and schools can and should be held
accountable for their failure to accurately identify disabilities when such a
failure creates educational harms.
Plaintiffs have attempted, at least, four different legal strategies to
challenge the over-identification of minority children with disabilities. Three
strategies grow out of the federal statutes governing special education: the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 11 Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section 504),12 and Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (Title II). 13 The fourth strategy extends from the prohibitions
on racial discrimination in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 14 and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 15 But, regardless of
how plaintiffs frame their claims, courts have been unreceptive. The Third
Circuit’s opinions in a series of cases arising out of Pennsylvania provide the
perfect example.
In 2007, a class of African-American students claimed their school was
misidentifying black students as disabled, moving them into lower level and
special education classes, denying them the opportunity to take regular
education courses, and leaving them inadequately prepared for college.16
Students claimed the district had no written policies or consistent standards
to assess disabilities.17 In the absence of those checks, racial stereotypes and
biases heavily influenced the identification process. 18 They argued the district
was identifying plaintiffs as having learning disabilities despite evidence to
the contrary.19 The data seemed to support their claim.20 African-American
who are not disabled, but were identified and treated by schools as though they had disabilities
that required special education services.
11. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2012).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012).
13. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 203, 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2012).
14. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
16. Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 255–57 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied
sub nom. Allston v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 135 S. Ct. 1738 (2015).
17. Brief for Appellant at 10, Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2014),
2012 WL 6625856 (C.A.3).
18. Id. at 6.
19. Id. at 10.
20. Blunt, 767 F.3d at 300.
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students made up eight percent of the overall student population in the district
but were fourteen percent of the special education population.21 Plaintiffs
further alleged that they missed educational opportunities as a direct result of
being labeled “learning disabled.”22 For example, most plaintiffs were not
offered science classes in middle school.23 They were placed in resource
classes that did not count towards GPA. 24 Many participated in “pull out”
instruction, where they were pulled from general education classrooms for
specialized instruction but never offered the opportunity to catch up on
missed material.25
Plaintiffs challenged their misidentification under Title VI and Equal
Protection.26 The trial and appellate courts dismissed their Title VI and Equal
Protection claims, reasoning that the plaintiffs had failed to plead intentional
discrimination.27 According to the Third Circuit, plaintiffs had simply plead
“errors in evaluation,” which do not give rise to race discrimination claims.28
Thus, despite dramatic evidence of over-identification, questionable
disability assessment protocols, and evidence of lost educational opportunity,
plaintiffs were unable to hold the school accountable for their
misidentification and resulting educational harm.29
Several plaintiffs subsequently filed individual lawsuits raising violations
of the IDEA, Section 504, and Title II of the ADA. 30 Courts dismissed the
IDEA claims, reasoning that plaintiffs, who were not claiming to be disabled,
had no access to the IDEA’s remedies which only extend to “children with
disabilities.”31 Section 504 and the ADA both offer broader definitions of
disability.32 Under both statutes, it is enough to be “regarded as” disabled,

21. Id.
22. Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at 6.
23. Id. at 16.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Blunt, 767 F.3d at 255. Plaintiffs also raised claims under IDEA, Section 504 and Title
II of the ADA; however, these claims were all dismissed for procedural reasons. Id. at 255, 259–
64. IDEA claims were dismissed for failure to exhaust and some were barred by the IDEA’s twoyear statute of limitations. Id. at 259. Section 504 and ADA claims were barred due to claim
preclusion as result of prior class action settlement in another case involving the Pennsylvania
Department of Education. Id. at 281.
27. Id. at 257.
28. Id. at 263.
29. Id. at 257.
30. A.G. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 542 F. App’x 193, 197–99 (3d Cir. 2013); S.H. ex rel.
Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 251 (3d Cir. 2013).
31. A.G., 542 F. App’x at 197; S.H., 729 F.3d at 255.
32. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012).
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regardless of one’s actual disability. 33 But here, the courts still rejected
plaintiffs’ claims because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the necessary
intentional discrimination.34 In short, the trial and appellate courts in the Third
Circuit refused to intervene in what appeared to be gross over-identification
of minorities and a failure to comply with the IDEA not because the students
were unharmed or the district did a reasonably good job providing services,
but because the courts reasoned that no relevant law protected the students,
despite the harm they incurred.
While these and other courts’ reasoning under Title VI is arguably correct,
their analysis under disability statutes is flawed on multiple accounts. First,
while non-disabled plaintiffs may lack a claim directly under the IDEA, the
IDEA’s structure for evaluating students remains relevant to claims under
Section 504 and the ADA. The IDEA’s affirmative obligations intersect with
the other statutes’ obligations to deliver a free appropriate education. A
district’s disregard for its obligations under IDEA is pertinent evidence that
the district has, in fact, discriminated against students whom they perceive to
be disabled. That discrimination may not be actionable under the IDEA, but
it is under the ADA and Section 504.
Second, courts analyzing disability misidentification claims have
misinterpreted the remedies provisions of Section 504 and Title II of the
ADA. Those remedy provisions indicate that Section 504 and Title II provide
the same remedies as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. 35 Meaning, both
statutes, like Title VI, allow for a private cause of action and the damages
flowing from a valid claim. Courts, however, have gone one step further and
reasoned that Section 504 and Title II plaintiffs must, in effect, present the
same type of evidence as plaintiffs in race cases: intentional discrimination.36
This additional step conflates available remedies with the evidence necessary
to secure a remedy. While interconnected, the two are distinct. More
important, disability discrimination and race discrimination are themselves
distinct. As Congress has repeatedly pointed out, disability discrimination is
largely a product of benign neglect, implicit biases against a group, rather
than affirmative desires to harm.37 When accounting for these differences,
Section 504 and Title II’s protection of individuals perceived as disabled
should easily include a cause of action for students whom districts harm as a
result of misidentifying them as disabled, whether intentionally or not.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

29 U.S.C. § 794(a); 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
A.G., 542 F. App’x at 198–99; S.H., 729 F.3d at 262–67.
29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2012).
A.G., 542 F. App’x at 198; S.H., 729 F.3d at 262–65.
See generally Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985).
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Third, even if intent were required to establish a claim under Section 504
or Title II, courts fail to apply the appropriate standard of intent in the context
of misidentification cases. Courts unreasonably frame intent as either a desire
on the part of the school to disadvantage students based on their perceived
disability or consciously disregarding disabled students’ needs. 38 Neither
standard is appropriate. Again, the nature of disability discrimination is
distinct from race. Thus, the failure to knowingly carry out obligations toward
students perceived as disabled, in and of itself, should satisfy the intent
standard needed to establish a violation Section 504 and Title II. Requiring
proof of the desire to harm misidentified students is unreasonable. The
provision of special education services to these students is by its very nature
an attempt to help, albeit a flawed attempt. Thus, the desire to harm would
never exist and the extrapolation of race concepts of discrimination to these
claims would amount to a per se bar for misidentified students. This result
would render the inclusion of misidentified students within the statutes’
protected class pointless—a result at odds with language and intent of the
statute.
Correctly analyzed, Section 504 and Title II of the ADA provide a
pathway for misidentified students to access remedies for educational harms
suffered as a result of their inaccurate designation as disabled. Once
established, this pathway would serve as an important check on the overplacement minority youth in special education. Congress has long been aware
of the problem of over-identification and, despite several IDEA amendments
targeting the issue, has failed to make much progress combatting it. Bringing
claims for injunctive relief through Section 504 and the ADA is a way to
reform the over-identification problems that have, thus far, alluded Congress
and educators alike.
This article will explore the misidentification claims as follows: Part II
examines the current problem surrounding misidentification of disabilities
and investigates the questions of why schools fail to accurately identify
disabilities and what harms arise out of misidentification. Part III then
analyzes the laws in place which purport to guard against discrimination on
the basis of race or disability and why those laws fail to offer remedies for
misidentified students. Finally, Part IV explores the possibility of injunctive
relief or compensatory damages, both of which may force schools to increase
accuracy of disability identification, thereby reducing the likelihood that
children will be misidentified.

38.

See, e.g., Carter v. Orleans Par. Pub. Sch. 725 F.2d 261, 264 (5th Cir. 1984).
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THE MISIDENTIFICATION DILEMMA
Misidentification: Why Do We Do It?

Schools are tasked with identifying, evaluating, and appropriately serving
children with disabilities as well as tracking their educational outcomes.39 The
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is the driving force
behind how schools interact with children who have disabilities and require
special education services.40 Several other statutes affect how schools interact
with children who may be disabled, most notably Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973,41 the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42
and the newly enacted, Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) which replaced
No Child Left Behind, in December of 2015.43 Because the IDEA creates the
most affirmative rights for students with disabilities, it is helpful to begin the
discussion there.
The IDEA operates much like a contract in which the federal government
promises funding to schools who agree to abide by IDEA’s proscriptions
regarding the treatment of students with disabilities.44 At the heart of the
contract is the obligation to provide all children with disabilities residing in
the state a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE). 45 States must
affirmatively seek out children who may have disabilities and fall within the

39. See generally Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1485
(2012); Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012); No Child Left
Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the U.S. Code) (repealed 2015).
40. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1485.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 794.
42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012).
43. Every Student Succeeds Act, Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1801 (2015). ESSA
reauthorizes the 50-year-old Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) and takes the
place of NCLB.
44. See generally 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1485 (2012).
45. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) (2012). The IDEA limits this obligation to children between the
ages of 3 and 21, and ages 3 through 5 and 18 through 21 only to the extent that the state is already
providing public education to children in those age ranges. Id. § 1412(a)(1)(B). Section 504 and
the ADA also require FAPE which will be discussed in Part II.C. of this Article.

48:0373]

THE MISIDENTIFICATION OF CHILDREN

381

statutes protections.46 This obligation, known as “child find,” is expansive.47
Schools must put in place procedures that will make it likely that they will be
able to identify these students, evaluate them and determine what, if any,
types of services they require in order to access the general education
curriculum.48 The mandate is broad, requiring that schools “find” disabled
students even among the private school population, migrant-children,
homeless children, and children who are passing from grade to grade and
thus, not obviously struggling academically. 49
Once a school becomes aware of a potential disability, they are obligated
to perform a timely and accurate assessment to determine whether the child
is a “child with a disability” within the meaning of the IDEA. 50 Following the
assessment, a team that includes, at a minimum, the parents of the child, one
regular-education teacher of the child, one special-education teacher of the
child, and a representative of the local educational agency must develop an
individualized education program (IEP) which complies with the procedures
of the IDEA and is “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive
educational benefits.”51 The IEP must describe the services that will be
provided for the child as well as educational goals for the child.52 This
detailed plan, often referred to as an educational “blueprint,” describes how
the school will engage with the child.53 If the parents disagree with any matter
related to the identification, evaluation, educational placement, or provision
of FAPE, they may request an impartial due process hearing. 54 If either party

46. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3). A child who is suspected of having a qualifying disability must
be identified “within a reasonable time after school officials are on notice of behavior that is likely
to indicate a disability,” W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 501 (3d Cir. 1995), even if the child is
advancing from grade to grade. D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 249 (3d Cir. 2012)
(citing 34 C.F.R. § 300.111(c)(1) (2015)); accord Bd. of Educ. of Fayette Cty. v. L.M., 478 F.3d
307, 313 (6th Cir. 2007); Taylor v. Altoona Area Sch. Dist., 737 F. Supp. 2d 474, 484 (W.D. Pa.
2010). A school district’s failure to timely evaluate a child who it should reasonably suspect of
having a disability constitutes a procedural violation of the IDEA. D.K., 696 F.3d at 249.
47. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3); 34 C.F.R. § 300.111 (2015).
48. 34 C.F.R. § 300.111(a).
49. 34 C.F.R. § 300.111(a)(1)(i), (c)(1)–(2).
50. The IDEA defines several categories of disability. A child must qualify under one of the
defined categories in order to be eligible for services under the IDEA. Importantly, a child may
have a disability as diagnosed by a medical professional, but may not meet the definition of a
“child with a disability” for purposes of the IDEA. This child may still receive protections under
other disability statutes. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)–(B) (2012).
51. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(d)(1)(B), (d)(3)(A) (2012); Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,
206–07 (1982).
52. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A) (2012).
53. Tatro v. Texas, 703 F.2d 823, 830 (5th Cir. 1983).
54. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6), (f)(1)(A) (2012).
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is aggrieved by the decision of the state educational agency, the party can file
a civil action in a Federal District Court.55
There are many areas of contention that arise throughout the process of
identifying and providing services to ensure FAPE. 56 At the forefront of this
process, and central to this paper, are eligibility determinations. Eligibility
determinations are rooted in evaluations of the child.57 Per the IDEA, a school
is required to “use a variety of assessment tools and strategies to gather
relevant functional, developmental, and academic information” that may
assist in determining whether the child qualifies for services and the types of
services that would allow the child to progress in the general education
curriculum.58 Although the IDEA requires that evaluations are selected and
administered in a way that avoids racial or cultural bias,59 it is universally
accepted that some categories of disability are more difficult to accurately
diagnose than others because they are not based on objective measures, but
rather rest on subjective observations.60
Psychologists split disabilities into two broad categories: judgment or
“low incidence” and non-judgment or “high incidence.”61 Non-judgment
disabilities are much easier to accurately identify as they are based on
scientific measures and can be objectively tested. 62 Examples of nonjudgment disabilities are deafness, blindness, and physical impairments.63
Judgment disabilities are much harder to accurately identify because they
require subjective judgment on the part of the evaluator.64 Examples of
judgment disabilities include learning disabilities, emotional disabilities, and
intellectual disabilities.65 Essentially, children who may have judgment
disabilities are more likely to be misdiagnosed as having a disability when
they do not simply due to the imperfect science that we use to measure such

55. § 1415(i)(2)(A).
56. See generally § 1414.
57. § 1414(b)(3); G.G. v. Dist. of Columbia, 924 F. Supp. 2d 273, 274 (D.D.C. 2013); 34
C.F.R. § 300.34(c)(10) (2015).
58. § 1414(b)(2)(A).
59. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)–(d) (2012).
60. See generally Elisa Hyman et al., How IDEA Fails Families Without Means: Causes
and Corrections from the Frontlines of Special Education, 20 J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 107,
109–62 (2011).
61. See generally Garda, supra note 3, at 1078 n.36; Sarah E. Redfield & Theresa Kraft,
What Color Is Special Education?, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 129, 182 (2012).
62. ÖZLEM SENSOY & ROBIN DIANGELO, IS EVERYONE REALLY EQUAL?: AN INTRODUCTION
TO KEY CONCEPTS IN SOCIAL JUSTICE EDUCATION 63–64 (2012).
63. Id. at 63.
64. See Redfield & Kraft, supra note 61, at 182.
65. Id.
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disabilities.66 More troubling, these categories of disabilities reflect the
problem of subconscious racial biases of evaluators as demonstrated in the
over-representation of racial and ethnic minorities therein.67
African-American, Latino, and Native-American youth are significantly
over-represented in certain categories of judgment disabilities. The vast
majority of students who receive special education services through the IDEA
fall into the category of “specific learning disability.” 68 According to recent
data, American-Indian/Alaska-Native students are 1.7 times more likely than
all other racial and ethnic groups combined to be identified as learning
disabled.69 African-American students are 1.4 times more likely and Latino
students are 1.0 times more likely. 70 There is no biological reason why
disabilities should be more prevalent in minority youth than white youth, yet
statistics indicate that youth of color continue to be over-represented in
certain categories of judgment disabilities, even when controlling for effects
of poverty.71
Though there is general agreement that over-representation exists, the
cause of such disparities remains unclear.72 Many scholars focus on poverty
as the root cause, with the general theory being that children in poverty face
more biological, environmental, and societal challenges than children from
66. Losen & Welner, supra note 1, at 420; see also Nicole M. Oelrich, A New “IDEA”:
Ending Racial Disparity in the Identification of Students with Emotional Disturbance, 57 S.D. L.
REV. 9, 28 (2012).
67. See Redfield & Kraft, supra note 61, at 199.
68. Hyman et al., supra note 60, at 113 (citing NAT’L DISSEMINATION CTR. FOR CHILDREN
WITH DISABILITIES, WHO ARE THE CHILDREN RECEIVING SPECIAL EDUCATION SERVICES 6 (2003)).
69. OFFICE SPECIAL EDUC. & REHAB. SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 36TH ANNUAL REPORT
TO CONGRESS, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH D ISABILITIES ACT, 2014, at xxv
(2014).
70. Id.
71. Garda, supra note 3, at 1086.
72. A recent study by Paul L. Morgan and George Farkas stands opposed to the previously
generally accepted view that minorities are over-represented in special education and rather
suggests that African-American children are actually underrepresented in certain eligibility
categories when controlling for effects of poverty. Paul L. Morgan et al., Minorities Are
Disproportionately Underrepresented in Special Education: Longitudinal Evidence Across Five
Disability Conditions, 44 EDUC. RESEARCHER 278, 287 (2015). However, several prominent
researchers have criticized the data on which the Morgan study is based. See J. Weston Phippen,
The Racial Imbalances of Special Education, THE ATLANTIC (July 6, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/07/the-racial-imbalances-of-specialeducation/397775/; Kevin Welner & Russell Skiba, Big News or Flawed Research? The New
Special
Education
Controversy,
HUFFPOST
EDUC.
(July
6,
2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kevin-welner/big-news-or-flawed-resear_b_7718746.html.
Even if the findings in the Morgan study are presumed to be accurate, it does not negate the actual
harm of misidentification, but rather only indicates that this harm does not impact as many
minority students as was previously thought.
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middle or high income families.73 For example, research indicates that
children from low income households are immersed in lower literacy
environments and higher levels of chronic stress which both negatively
impact a child’s ability to obtain basic academic competencies at the pre-K
level.74 Further, the biological effects of poverty which include low birth
weight, poor nutrition, and increased exposure to toxins (such as lead,
alcohol, and drugs) can all impact educational achievement.75 Because a
disproportionate number of African-American and Latino youth live in lowincome households, children from these racial and ethnic groups are affected
in larger numbers.76
Related to poverty, an additional factor complicating accurate
identification of minority students with disabilities, is the lack of resources in
the schools serving a majority of this student population. Schools serving
low-income minority populations are often under-funded or underresourced.77 When schools lack resources, they are unable to retain the
necessary professionals on staff to ensure competent and accurate evaluations
of children with disabilities.78 At a more basic level, these schools often lack
the ability to hire and retain well-trained, general-education teachers
equipped with the appropriate skills and knowledge necessary to develop and
implement effective curriculum.79 When proper curriculum is not being
taught in the general education program, children fail to develop basic
academic competencies. As former education secretary Rod Paige put it,
73. See James E. Ryan, Poverty as Disability and the Future of Special Education Law, 101
GEO. L.J. 1455, 1458 n.13 (2013). According to a 2003 report by the National Dissemination
Center for Children with Disabilities, nearly a quarter (2 million) of all children eligible for special
education services live below the poverty line and approximately two-thirds (4.5 million) of all
children eligible live in households where the total income is less than $50,000. Hyman et al.,
supra note 60, at 112–13 (citing NAT’L DISSEMINATION CTR. FOR CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES,
WHO ARE THE CHILDREN RECEIVING SPECIAL EDUCATION SERVICES 6 (2003)).
74. Education
and
Socioeconomic
Status,
AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N,
http://www.apa.org/pi/ses/resources/publications/factsheet-education.aspx (last visited May 17,
2016).
75. Ryan, supra note 73, at 1483.
76. The National Center for Children in Poverty indicates in 2013, 31% of white children
(ages 18 and under) lived in low-income households (between 100%–199% of the federal poverty
threshold), while 65% of African-American children and 63% of Hispanic children came from
low-income households. YANG JIANG ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY, BASIC
FACTS ABOUT LOW-INCOME CHILDREN: CHILDREN UNDER 18 YEARS, 2013, at 4 (2015).
77. BRUCE D. BAKER & SEAN P. CORCORAN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE STEALTH
INEQUITIES OF SCHOOL FUNDING: HOW STATE AND LOCAL SCHOOL FINANCE SYSTEMS
PERPETUATE INEQUITABLE STUDENT SPENDING 1 (2012), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/09/StealthInequities.pdf.
78. Garda, supra note 3, at 1086.
79. Id. at 1084.
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“[o]ur educational system fails to teach many children fundamental skills like
reading, then inappropriately identifies some of them as having disabilities,
thus harming the educational future of those children who are misidentified
and reducing the resources available to serve children with disabilities.” 80 In
short, children who need more intensive instruction and support are attending
schools that are the least likely to provide them with such supports.
Consequently, it comes as no surprise to find that many of these schools fail
to accurately identify children with disabilities.81
Despite the immense burdens of poverty, poverty alone cannot account for
the over-representation of African-Americans in certain disability categories.
African-American children are more likely to be identified with disabilities
even in higher income schools.82 Further, Congress, itself, has acknowledged
“schools with predominately [w]hite students and teachers have placed
disproportionately high numbers of their minority students into special
education.”83 And finally, similar disparities along racial and ethnic lines are
not present in the hard science, non-judgement disability categories.84 The
explanation we are left with is that a certain amount of bias creeps its way
into the evaluation process, making it more likely that a young black child’s
reading struggles will be interpreted as a disability than his white peers. 85 A
majority of scholars, scientists, advocates, educators, and even legislators all
agree on this point—minority youth who are not disabled are currently being
labeled and treated as though they have disabilities.
It is important to consider the significant distinction between mislabeling
one disability for another and misidentifying a child as having a disability
when she has none. Mislabeling a child with the wrong disability, although
worrisome, is at least theoretically redressable through the IDEA. Although
the IDEA is not overly concerned with accuracy of the disability label, it is
designed to ensure appropriate supports and services.86 A cornerstone of the
IDEA is the provision of appropriate services designed to meet individual
educational needs irrespective of disability category. 87 If an IEP itself is
individualized to a particular child, effective for that child, and the proper
procedures were used to develop the IEP, then a child will not get relief for

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 1073.
Id. at 1086–87.
Id. at 1088.
20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(12)(E) (2012).
Garda, supra note 3; Losen & Welner, supra note 1, at 416–17.
Losen & Welner, supra note 1, at 419.
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(B) (2012).
Id.
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an incorrect disability label or category.88 However, if incorrect services are
in place, a mislabeled child has access to the procedural protections in the
IDEA and can challenge the adequacy of services through due process.89
Misidentifying a child with a disability when she in fact has none is
potentially much more damaging. This child, were she to be harmed, is
unable to seek redress through the IDEA as she is not a “child with a
disability” under the IDEA and thus not privy to its protections. In fact, the
misidentified child is in a worse position, as far as remedies are concerned,
than the child who has an IDEA eligible disability but was never identified
as such by her school district. The latter still has rights under the IDEA to
challenge the school’s failure to timely identify and evaluate her as a child
with a disability. 90 Finally, as discussed in Part III of this Article, the
misidentified child may not even have a remedy under any of the antidiscrimination statutes currently in place to relating to the rights of persons
with disabilities or those perceived as having disabilities.
B.

Misidentification: Why Should We Care?

Having discussed why it is difficult to properly diagnose the category of
judgment disabilities as well as the evidence proving that schools are doing a
poor job of it, it is incumbent to discuss the underlying issue of why this
matters. What is the harm in misidentifying a child as having a disability
when she does not?91 After all, the IDEA’s purpose is to support children with
disabilities and provide them with services designed to promote academic
achievement, as well as procedural rights to hold schools accountable when
they fail to offer and implement such services. 92 A logical assumption is a
child who is struggling with reading could certainly benefit from extra
academic supports, regardless of whether she technically meets the definition
88. R.C. ex rel. S.K. v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist., 958 F. Supp. 2d 718, 732 (N.D. Tex. 2013)
(holding plaintiff’s belief that he was mislabeled as emotionally disabled rather than autistic did
not result in a denial of FAPE because the court’s main focus is whether the IEP itself was
“sufficiently individualized to meet plaintiff's unique needs and provide him with educational
benefits”); see also, 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(3)(B).
89. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2012).
90. See child find requirements under 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(3).
91. Research indicates that children with severe disabilities may often benefit dramatically
from services put in place through an IEP; however, this discussion is limited to a discussion of
the category of judgment disabilities which are often known as high-incidence due to their
statistical significance as the majority of disabilities occurring in the K–12 public education
context. See Garda, supra note 3, at 1086; Losen & Welner, supra note 1, at 420; Oelrich, supra
note 66.
92. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (2012).
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of learning disabled.93 But, the harm of being labeled and subsequently
treated as a child with a disability can be significant. It can equate to stigma,
lowered educational opportunity, and increased contact with the juvenile
justice system.94 Thus, before extending such a label, it is vital that educators
understand the potential risks and pitfalls that distinction of “special
education” may carry.
Statistics indicate children with IEPs tend to take less challenging courses,
have lower graduation rates, and attend college at lower levels than children
who do not receive special education services.95 This is certainly not to say
that children with disabilities cannot achieve at the same academic level as
their peers. The vast majority of children with IEPs can and should be
achieving at the same level as their peers, with obvious exceptions for
children with severe intellectual disabilities. 96 In fact, the IDEA requires that
children with disabilities must be held to the same accountability standards
as any other child.97 Despite these mandates, children with disabilities tend to
lag behind their peers when it comes to academic achievement.98 Many
93. Several scholars have called for an expansion of special education eligibility to make it
easier for children to get the supports they need; however, such calls downplay the serious harms
that can come with over-inclusion of children labeled as disabled. Compare Wendy F. Hensel,
Sharing the Short Bus: Eligibility and Identity Under the IDEA, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1147, 1152
(2007) (concluding that “although the special education population increasingly includes students
with more moderate, intangible impairments, this growth is positive in some respects and
consistent with early Congressional intent to bring all students, regardless of functioning, into the
mainstream of American education”), and Mark C. Weber, The IDEA Eligibility Mess, 57 BUFF.
L. REV. 83, 86 (2009) (concluding that the solution is a renewed attention by courts and
educational policy makers to the actual terms of the statute and the underlying purposes), with
Garda, supra note 3, at 1086.
94. Michael L. Perlin, “Simplify You, Classify You”: Stigma, Stereotypes and Civil Rights
in Disability Classification Systems, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 607, 608 (2009) (arguing that the
process of labeling children with intellectual disabilities can be a “triple-edged” or “quadrupleedged” sword in that it increases the challenges that child will face in obtaining educational
achievement).
95. Glennon, supra note 3, at 1241.
96. See Garda, supra note 3, at 1107.
97. The IDEA requires each child’s IEP to include “a statement of measurable annual goals,
including academic and functional goals, designed to meet the child’s needs that result from the
child’s disability to enable the child to be involved in and make progress in the general education
curriculum.” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II)-(II)(aa) (2012). Further, it requires “a statement of
any individual appropriate accommodations that are necessary to measure the academic
achievement and functional performance of the child on State and district wide assessments
consistent with section 1412(a)(16)(A).” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VI)(aa) (2012). See
generally Perry A. Zirkel, NCLB: What Does It Mean for Students with Disabilities?, 185 EDUC.
L. REP. 805 (2004).
98. SHERYL S. LAZARUS ET AL., NAT’L CTR. ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, 2013-14 PUBLICALLY
REPORTED ASSESSMENT RESULTS FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES AND ELLS WITH DISABILITIES
(2016); see also Glennon, supra note 3, at 1259.
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psychologists and academics highlight the stigma associated with being a
child with a disability as one reason for the lowered academic achievement.
Once labeled as such, a “child with a disability” often has lower expectations
for herself after grasping what that label means.99 Further, teachers often
lower expectations for children with disabilities making under-achievement
a self-fulfilling prophecy.100 Thus, although special education services were
designed to provide a benefit, for some children the designation more often
means limited educational opportunity.
More troubling, students designated as disabled have higher rates of
contact with the juvenile justice system. Research indicates that up to one-inthree children arrested nationally has a disability. 101 National statistics
demonstrate students with emotional disabilities and learning disabilities are
arrested at higher rates than their nondisabled peers. 102 However, it is
important to clarify this does not indicate a causation—that children with
disabilities are more likely to engage in criminal behavior—but rather only
suggests that a correlation exists between being identified as disabled and
having contact with the juvenile justice system.103
More than other racial or ethnic groups, African-American children may
be particularly harmed by the special education label. Studies demonstrate
that black children are less likely to have a positive outcome from special
education than their white peers.104 One issue is that African-American
students are more likely than their white peers to be placed in restrictive self-

99. MINORITY STUDENTS, supra note 1, at 1–3; Glennon, supra note 3, at 1241; Perlin, supra
note 94, at 631.
100. MINORITY STUDENTS, supra note 1, at 1–3; Glennon, supra note 3, at 1241; Perlin, supra
note 94, at 631.
101. Mary Magee Quinn et al., Youth with Disabilities in Juvenile Corrections: A National
Survey, 71 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 339, 342 (2005).
102. Sue Burrell & Loren Warboys, Special Education and the Juvenile Justice System, JUV.
JUST. BULL., July 2000, at 1, http:// www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/179359.pdf.
103. See ROBERT B. RUTHERFORD JR. ET AL., YOUTH WITH DISABILITIES IN THE
CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM: PREVALENCE RATES AND IDENTIFICATION ISSUES 7–19 (2002),
http://cecp.air.org/juvenilejustice/docs/Youth%20with%20Disabilities.pdf
(describing
the
prevalence of disabilities in detained youth as compared to the general population); David Osher
et al., Schools Make a Difference: The Overrepresentation of African American Youth in Special
Education and the Juvenile Justice System, in RACIAL INEQUITY IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 93, 99–
100 (Daniel J. Losen & Gary Orfield eds., 2005) (concluding that the educational system is
allowing children with, or at risk for, emotional disturbance to be funneled into the juvenile justice
system rather than supporting their emotional, behavioral, and educational needs); Joseph B.
Tulman, Disability and Delinquency: How Failures to Identify, Accommodate, and Serve Youth
with Education-Related Disabilities Leads to Their Disproportionate Representation in the
Delinquency System, 3 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 3, 4 n.2 (2003).
104. MINORITY STUDENTS, supra note 1, at 1–3; Losen & Welner, supra note 1, at 418–19.
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contained classrooms with less access to the general education curriculum.105
Children with disabilities benefit more when educated amongst their peers,
and thus this inclusive setting is mandated by statute.106 Unfortunately, once
students are placed in more restrictive settings, it is often difficult to move
back into the regular education environment.107
Sadly, but perhaps not surprisingly, this is not a new phenomenon. Overidentification of African-American students in certain disability categories
has been of significant federal concern for quite some time.108 As early as the
1970s, the United States Department of Education was aware of
overrepresentation of minorities, and particularly African-Americans, in
certain special education disability categories. 109 The IDEA explicitly
acknowledges that issue, stating “greater efforts are needed to prevent the
intensification of problems conncected with mislabeling... minority children
with disabilities.”110 The House committee report prepared in anticipation of
the IDEA further illuminates Congress's concerns that “[f]or minority
students misclassification or inappropriate placement in special education
programs can have signficicant adverse consequences, particularly when
these students are being removed from regular educatin settings and denied
access to the core curriculum.”111
Congress attempted to address overidentification through the IDEA in
several ways. It required states to take affirmative steps by enacting policies
and procedures designed to reduce and prevent over-identification.112 It also
explicitly included language directing that testing and evaluation materials
“must not be racially or culturally discriminatory.” 113 Congress, by
acknowledging the interwoven nature of race and misidentification, sought

105. Garda, supra note 3, at 1084–85.
106. 20 USC § 1412(a)(5) (2012).
107. Garda, supra note 3, 1084–85; Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, and the
Limits of Private Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413, 1469 (2011).
108. MINORITY STUDENTS, supra note 1, at 15. “In 1979 the National Research Council
(NRC) was asked to conduct a study to determine the factors accounting for the disproportionate
representation of minority students and males in special education programs for students with
mental retardation, and to identify placement criteria or practices that do not affect minority
students and males disproportionately. More than 20 years later, they were again asked to revisit
the issue.” Id. at 1–2; see also Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 985–87 (9th Cir. 1984).
109. Osher et al., supra note 103.
110. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(12)(A) (2012).
111. H.R. REP. NO. 108-77, at 84 (2003).
112. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(24) (requires state to have “policies and procedures designed to
prevent the inappropriate over-identification or disproportionate representation by race and
ethnicity of children as children with disabilities”).
113. § 1412(a)(6)(B).
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to better guard against its effects through an emphasis on accurate and
unbiased evaluations.
Further, in 2004, Congress again amended the IDEA, with two changes
focused on the persistent overrepresentation dilemma.114 First, it added a
provision which allows schools to use up to 15% of funds to provide “early
intervening services” to students before they are identified as needing special
education services with the goal of addressing potential challenges to learning
early so that children are developmentally ready to achieve once they enter
kindergarten.115 Second, Congress changed the requirements surrounding
diagnoses of specific learning disabilities, the category representing by far
the largest percentage of IDEA eligible children. In the past, a specific
learning disability diagnosis was based on evidence of severe discrepancy
between IQ and ability.116 Over time academics criticized this method of
diagnosis, claiming it exacerbated misidentification of minorities because it
was based on assessments which were inherently biased. 117 The 2004
amendments added a new diagnostic tool termed Response to Intervention
(RTI).118 RTI focuses on providing increasingly intensive and evidence based
instruction in the general education setting prior to referring a child for a
special education eligibility evaluation.119 The hope was that increased
support and personally tailored instruction in the general education classroom
would help children overcome academic struggles without needing to resort
to special education.120 At the same time, the RTI process would ferret out
those children with true learning disabilities, who would then be referred for
special education evaluations.121 Unfortunately, RTI has not proven to be the
answer to the misidentification quandary, and the problem of overidentification persists.122
In sum, African-American students labeled as needing special education
services are at risk of inaccurate identification, negative stigma, lowered
academic expectations, including denial of access to the general education
curriculum, increased contact with the juvenile justice system, and reduced
chances of obtaining higher education and gainful employment. Although
114. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1450 (2012).
115. Id. § 1413(f), (a)(4)(A)(ii).
116. Angela Ciolfi & James Ryan, Race and Response-to-Intervention in Special Education,
54 HOW. L.J. 303, 304 (2011).
117. Id. at 339.
118. § 1400(c)(5)(F).
119. Id.
120. Ciolfi & Ryan, supra note 116, at 305.
121. Id.
122. Id. (arguing that RTIs and the 2004 Amendments to IDEA have not eliminated
misidentification along racial lines).
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Congress has attempted to address some of these inequities, thus far,
legislative fixes have proven inept at solving this complex problem. One
problem may be the school districts, who are ultimately responsible for
accurate identification of disabilities, are not held accountable for their
failures in this regard. The following section will discuss how schools escape
responsibility for educational harms imposed on minority students through
inaccurate identification of disability.
III.

SCHOOLS MISIDENTIFY WITH IMPUNITY—A HARM, WITH NO FOUL

Despite the challenges involved in diagnosing certain categories of
judgement disabilities, schools, nonetheless, are tasked with finding children
who may have disabilities, referring them for evaluations, and accurately
conducting those evaluations, such that they root out disabilities in a nonbiased manner. Three separate laws—the IDEA, Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities
Act—all mandate accurate identification of disability. 123 Logic would dictate
that if schools fail in this regard, they would be held accountable under one,
if not all three, laws. As the following section demonstrates, logic fails to
govern this murky world of disability identification. Currently, a student who
learns that she was inaccurately categorized as learning disabled and
subsequently placed in lower achieving classes based on this label, will find
no remedy in any of the laws that ostensibly guarantee equal educational
opportunity for children with disabilities. To date, courts have seemed largely
unwilling to hold schools accountable for misidentification, even when it
results in educational harm.
A.

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

The IDEA places the most affirmative obligations on schools and also
contains the most procedural protections for students with disabilities.
Section 1415 sets forth procedural safeguards for the statute, stating in part
“children with disabilities and their parents” must have an opportunity to
present a complaint “with respect to any matter relating to the identification,
evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free
appropriate public education to such child.”124 Courts interpreting this section
within the context of misidentification cases have held that students who
acknowledge that they are not disabled do not have standing to bring an IDEA
123. 34 C.F.R. § 300.304 (2015); 34 C.F.R. § 104.35 (2015); 28 C.F.R. § 35.103(a) (2015).
124. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a), (b)(6)(A) (2012).
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complaint as they are not a “child with a disability.” 125 An example of such a
case is S.H. v. Lower Merion School District.126
In S.H., a high school student alleged violations of the IDEA, Section 504,
and the ADA when her school misidentified her as learning disabled and
subsequently placed her in special education courses.127 S.H. claimed that she
missed out on science and foreign language courses due to her special
education classification and sought compensatory education through the
IDEA as well as monetary damages through the ADA and Section 504.128
When evaluating the IDEA claim, the court, looking at the plain meaning of
the statute, held that the IDEA’s guarantees are limited to “children with
disabilities and their parents” and upheld the district court’s dismissal of the
IDEA claim.129 Several other circuits have analyzed the issue in the same
way, essentially holding that because the child was mistakenly classified as
disabled, she is not a “child with a disability” and subsequently does not have
standing under the IDEA.130
At first blush, this analysis is compelling in its apparent simplicity. A
guiding principal of statutory interpretation is to begin with plain language.
The Supreme Court has consistently held “[w]hen the words of a statute are
unambiguous, then the first canon [of statutory interpretation] is also the last:
judicial inquiry is complete.”131 Where plain language is ambiguous or where
“literal application of the plain language would frustrate the statute’s purpose
or lead to an absurd result,” courts should look to legislative history to help
clear up ambiguity. 132 In misidentification cases, relying on plain language
alone is flawed for three reasons. First, the IDEA creates a substantive right
125. S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 260 (3d Cir. 2013)
(granting summary judgment for school district in misidentification claims under IDEA because
plain language of the statute limited to children with disabilities); J.P. v. Anchorage Sch. Dist.,
260 P.3d 285, 291 (Alaska 2011) (denying reimbursement of parents’ out-of-pocket tutoring
where child was ultimately found ineligible for special education services).
126. S.H., 729 F.3d at 248.
127. S.H.’s 504 and ADA claims will be discussed in section III.C. of this Article.
128. S.H., 729 F.3d at 251–56.
129. Id. at 257.
130. D.G. v. Flour Bluff Indep. Sch. Dist., 481 F. App’x 887 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding the
school not in violation because child ultimately did not require special education services); R.B.
ex rel. F.B. v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 496 F.3d 932, 942 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that
even though absence of special education teacher in eligibility determination meeting was a
procedural violation, it did not result in a denial of FAPE because student was not eligible for
services under the IDEA); J.P., 260 P.3d at 285.
131. Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) (quoting Rubin v. United
States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)).
132. Nat’l Coal. for Students with Disabilities Educ. & Legal Def. Fund v. Allen, 152 F.3d
283, 288 (4th Cir. 1988); see also Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 573–74 (2011).
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to an accurate and unbiased evaluation for children suspected of having
disabilities, not just children who do, in fact, have disabilities. For
misidentified children, the school clearly failed to meet this statutory
obligation by the very fact that the school inaccurately identified them as
disabled. Second, the IDEA creates a cause of action to challenge
identification claims and courts routinely hear such cases without knowing
whether the plaintiff has an underlying disability. 133 Thus, literal application
of the statute would “lead to an absurd result” as courts would only be
permitted to hear eligibility cases from plaintiffs who were bonafide IDEA
eligible “children with disabilities” making the question of eligibility
irrelevant. Third, misidentified minority children have historically been a
central focus of the IDEA. Congress has repeatedly acknowledged the
problem of over-identification of minorities for certain categories of
disability and has amended the IDEA to address this issue. It seems obvious
that with misidentification being at the heart of Congress’s concern when
drafting the IDEA, minority children who find themselves harmed through
misidentification should have a remedy within the statute to address these
harms. Thus, plain language alone does not resolve the question of whether
misidentified students have rights under the IDEA.
However, even assuming misidentified students have a procedural right to
accurate evaluations and eligibility determinations, they may not have access
to a suitable remedy within the IDEA. The IDEA’s central purpose is the
guarantee of free appropriate public education (FAPE) to students with
disabilities. It does not govern appropriate education for general education
students. In order for a court to find a remedy for a misidentified student
within the IDEA, it would need to read in an implied remedy based on the
substantive right to accurate and unbiased evaluations. Courts thus far, have
not been willing to do so, but perhaps this decision is rooted in a stilted
analysis based only in the plain language of the text. The following sections
explore the substantive and procedural rights that apply misidentified
students, thus creating a pathway to an implied remedy.

133. R.B., 496 F.3d at 932 (finding child was ineligible for services under the IDEA because
her mild depression did not rise to the level of “severe emotional disturbance.” Although school
district violated procedural requirements of IDEA by not including special education teacher on
the IEP team, the violation did not result in the loss of FAPE because child was found ineligible
for IDEA services); see also Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 525 (2007); D.C.
v. Mount Olive Twp. Bd. of Educ., No. 12-5592, 2014 WL 1293534 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2014).
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The IDEA Creates a Substantive Right to Unbiased Evaluations
and Eligibility Determinations

The IDEA demands schools conduct comprehensive evaluations in order
to determine whether the child has an IDEA eligible disability as well as the
educational needs of that child.134 In order to ensure accuracy in the
evaluation process, the statute requires: use of a variety of assessment tools,
technically sound instruments, valid and reliable assessments or measures,
and administration by trained and knowledgeable persons.135 In addition, the
IDEA makes clear that assessments must be “selected and administered so as
not to be discriminatory on a racial or cultural basis”136 and that schools must
assess children in “all areas of suspected disability.” 137 When schools fail to
live up to these requirements, they are held liable.138
To put it plainly, all students with suspected disabilities are entitled to
unbiased and accurate evaluations and eligibility determinations, including
misidentified students. Misidentified students were once suspected of having
disabilities. This suspicion is what brought them within the umbrella of the
IDEA. Schools, following IDEA mandates, conducted evaluations to
determine whether or not these students were IDEA eligible students with
disabilities. In the case of misidentified students, schools simply got it wrong.
They inaccurately found disabilities where none were present. This mistake,
if it results in educational harms, should be borne by the school district and
not the student.

134. 20 U.S.C. §1414(b)(2)(A); M.Z. ex rel. D.Z v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., No. 11-2887,
2013 WL 1224091, at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 27 2013) (finding that where school’s assessment tools
and strategies were not "sufficiently comprehensive," school had to pay for an independent
educational evaluation of the child); Sch. Dist. of Phila. v. Drummond, No. 14-2804, 2016 WL
1444566, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 12, 2016) (holding school’s flawed assessment which misdiagnosed
child as intellectually disabled entitled the child to an independent educational evaluation at public
expense).
135. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2)–(3). This does not present an exhaustive list of IDEA
requirements. Additional requirements demand that assessments are provided and administered
in the language and form most likely to yield accurate results, are administered according to their
instructions, and that children are assessed in all areas of suspected disability. See § 1414(b)(3).
136. § 1414(b)(3)(A)(i).
137. § 1414(b)(3)(B).
138. Millburn Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. J.S.O., No. 13–1208 (FSH), 2014 WL 3619979, at *2
(D.N.J. July 21, 2014) (New Jersey School District denied FAPE to girl with autism when it failed
to evaluate her in all areas of suspected disability); S.F. v. McKinney Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 4:10–
CV–323–RAS–DDB, 2012 WL 718589, at *1 (D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2012) (finding the school’s
evaluations were inappropriate where they assessed a student with autism and a hearing
impairment using a tool which cautioned against use with hearing impaired individuals and failed
to administer assessments in the student's best known language, sign language).
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The IDEA Creates a Cause of Action to Challenge Identification
and Evaluation of Disability

The IDEA permits a “child with a disability” to present a complaint “with
respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational
placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education
to such child.”139 Scores of children and parents bring complaints related to
identification and evaluation across the country each year. 140 When a court
considers such a case, it must decide the underlying issue of whether or not
the child is a “child with a disability” and as such entitled to receive FAPE as
required by the IDEA. The child may not be a “child with a disability,” but
the case is still properly before the court because the IDEA tasks courts with
resolving such disputes and grants children the right to bring complaints
about identification and evaluation.141 Thus, it is simply illogical to hold that
only “children with disabilities” and their parents can have standing under
the IDEA to bring complaints about identification or evaluation. Rather, it
seems the type of claim—identification, evaluation, or placement and
subsequent challenge to FAPE—determines whether or not the action is
redressable under the IDEA.
For example, a Connecticut district court applied such an analysis in an
eligibility context and held that a school violated the IDEA even when it
turned out that the child later did not have an IDEA eligible disability. 142 In
M.A. v. Torrington Board of Education, a student alleged that the school had
failed to evaluate him to determine whether his severe asthma fit within the
category of Other Health Impairment (OHI) such that he was eligible for

139. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (b)(6)(A) (2005).
140. D.G. v. Flour Bluff Indep. Sch. Dist., 481 F. App’x 887 (5th Cir. 2012); Davis v.
Hampton Pub. Sch. Dist., 396 F. App’x 960 (4th Cir. 2010); R.B. ex rel. F.B. v. Napa Valley
Unified Sch. Dist., 496 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodiriecus v. Waukegan Sch. Dist. No. 60, 90
F.3d 249 (7th Cir. 1996); J.P. v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 260 P.3d 285 (Alaska 2011); see generally
Perry A. Zirkel & Brent L. Johnson, The “Explosion” in Education Litigation: An Updated
Analysis, 265 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2011) (indicating that special education litigation in federal courts
has consistently increased each year since 1980).
141. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 516–17 (2007) (“Any party
aggrieved by the [hearing officer’s] findings and decision has the right to bring a civil action with
respect to the complaint.”).
142. Compare M.A. v. Torrington Bd. of Educ., 980 F. Supp. 2d 245, 265 (D. Conn. 2013)
(holding that board’s refusal to continue evaluation process for child was a denial of FAPE, even
though child was ultimately found to be ineligible for services), with D.G. v. Flour Bluff Indep.
Sch. Dist., 481 F. App’x 887 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that no violation of child find where child
is shown ineligible for services because IDEA does not penalize school districts for not timely
evaluating students who do not need special education).
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special education services under the IDEA.143 He argued the school’s refusal
to evaluate him violated his right to FAPE. 144 The court held that the school
was obligated to evaluate M.A. and determine whether he was eligible for
special education services, and the school’s failure to do so was a violation
of FAPE.145 The court reached this conclusion even though it also concluded
that M.A. was ultimately ineligible for special education services through the
IDEA.146 The fact that the child was ineligible for special education services
meant that the school was not responsible for the tuition reimbursement that
parents sought as a remedy. 147 To put it another way, the court made a
distinction between procedural rights and remedial rights. It concluded that
all children have the procedural rights guaranteed by the IDEA—to invoke
due process and have their day in court. But, the court in M.A. also said that
only certain children, those with IDEA eligible disabilities, have remedial
rights under the statute—the right to invoke the remedies contained therein.148
An analogous interpretation of procedural rights exists in the context of
discipline cases under the IDEA. Prior to 1997, the IDEA did not speak to the
issue of whether or not a child, who had not yet been found IDEA eligible,
could invoke IDEA procedural protections by claiming a disability after the
disciplinary action had begun.149 For example, in a case arising out of the
Ninth Circuit, Hacienda v. Honig,150 the plaintiff student was expelled for
frightening another student with a starter pistol. Prior to the incident, the
plaintiff, at his mother’s request, was evaluated but found ineligible for
special education. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff engaged in the activity which
143. M.A., 980 F. Supp. 2d at 245. OHI is defined as “limited strength, vitality, or alertness
that . . . (1) is due to chronic or acute health problems such as asthma, attention deficit disorder
or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, diabetes, epilepsy, a heart condition . . . and (2)
adversely affects a child’s educational performance.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(9) (2007).
144. M.A., 980 F. Supp. 2d at 245.
145. Id. The court in M.A. relied upon precedent from the Supreme Court in Forest Grove
School District v. T.A., which held, “a school district’s failure to propose an IEP of any kind is at
least as serious a violation of its responsibilities under IDEA as a failure to provide an adequate
IEP.” Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 238–39 (2009).
146. The court found that due to M.A.’s average and above average educational performance,
his asthma did not adversely affect his education. M.A., 980 F. Supp. 2d at 278.
147. Id. at 278–79.
148. Id.
149. In 1997, IDEA was amended to include additional procedural protections for disabled
students who were facing school discipline, including mandating that schools conduct
manifestation determination hearings to determine whether the conduct at issue is a manifestation
of the child’s disability. If conduct is determined to be a manifestation of the child’s disability,
the school is limited in its ability to punish the child for that behavior. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k) (2012).
Thus, children facing school expulsion can dramatically increase their chances of staying in
school if they are able to successfully assert that a disability was at the root of their conduct.
150. Hacienda v. Honig, 976 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1992).
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resulted in expulsion. The plaintiff, through his mother, initiated an IDEA
due process complaint claiming he had a disability and was entitled to IDEA
protections.151 A hearing officer sided with plaintiff, finding him IDEA
eligible, his behavior was a manifestation of this disability, and therefore he
was entitled to the protections offered in the IDEA including placement with
services at the public school. The school appealed, claiming the IDEA is
limited to “children with disabilities” and since the plaintiff was not found to
have a disability prior to invoking procedural protections, he had no rights
under the IDEA. The Ninth Circuit rejected the school’s argument, holding
“[t]he IDEA and accompanying federal regulations [sic] make plain that,
even though not previously identified as disabled, the student’s alleged
disability may be raised in an IDEA administrative due process hearing.” 152
Thus, the plain language limiting procedural protections to “children with
disabilities” was set aside when it obviously did not comport with the purpose
of the statute. It was unknown whether the child in Hacienda was a “child
with a disability” when the matter came before the court. However, the court
proceeded to consider the case because the question of disability was at the
heart of the case and is central to the purpose of the IDEA.
The obvious difference between Hacienda and a misidentified claim is
that in Hacienda the child was alleging a disability; in a misidentified claim,
the child is alleging she is not disabled. This may be a crucial difference that
will ultimately prevent the misidentified child from finding remedy within
the IDEA.153 The question being, even if the misidentified child has standing
to bring a claim under the IDEA (procedural rights), does she have a right to
a remedy under the statute (remedial rights)?
The IDEA’s discussion of remedies is contained within Section 1415
“Procedural Safeguards.” Although the opening paragraph mandates
procedures “to ensure that children with disabilities and their parents are
151. The mother wanted to invoke IDEA’s “stay put” provision, which mandates that
children facing discipline proceedings must remain in their “then current educational placement”
during the pendency of the often lengthy administrative proceedings. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j); see
generally Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 297 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2002)
(referring to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) as the IDEA’s “stay-put” provision).
152. Hacienda, 976 F.2d at 492.
153. After Hacienda, Congress clarified the stay put regulation by including a new section
outlining protections for children not yet eligible for special education and related services, 20
U.S.C. § 1415(k)(5). Under this section, children may still invoke IDEA protections if the school
“had knowledge that the child was a child with a disability before the behavior that precipitated
the disciplinary action occurred.” A school has knowledge when: (1) the parent expressed concern
in writing to the school; (2) the parent requested an evaluation of the child; or (3) a teacher or
other personnel of the school expressed specific concerns about a pattern of behavior. §
1415(k)(5)(i)–(iii).
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guaranteed procedural safeguards,” a subsequent paragraph grants a
reviewing court broad authority to grant “such relief as [it] determines
appropriate.”154 Courts interpreting the scope of this section have generally
found it to have a broad reach, determining that relief must be “appropriate”
in light of the purpose of the IDEA. 155 The IDEA’s purpose is clearly
grounded in ensuring a free appropriate public education for children with
disabilities.156 The provision of FAPE, too, is explicitly tied to “children with
disabilities.”157 Thus, even if a misidentified child could bring a claim
challenging inaccurate identification, by virtue of not being a child with a
disability, a court may find that remedies for this child are outside of the
purpose of the IDEA. In short, the school district could successfully claim
that it is not obligated to provide a misidentified child with FAPE, thus,
obliterating the chance for any remedy.
At times courts look past the literal reading of a statute when it leads to an
absurd or unjust result. For example, in a recent Supreme Court case relating
to a school’s failure to find a child IDEA eligible, the Court stated in dicta,
“[i]t would be particularly strange for the [IDEA] to provide a remedy, as all
agree it does, when a school district offers a child inadequate specialeducation services but to leave parents without relief in the more egregious
situation in which the school district unreasonably denies a child access to
such services altogether.”158
Similarly, in this instance, it seems “particularly strange” to provide a
remedy when a school unreasonably fails to identify a child as having a
disability when she alleges one, but deny a remedy when the school wrongly
154. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a), (i)(2)(C)(iii).
155. See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 247 (2009); Sch. Comm. of the Town
of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep’t of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985); Draper v. Atlanta
Indep. Sch. Sys., 518 F. 3d 1275, 1280 (11th Cir. 2008). Courts have traditionally been willing to
order relief in the form of compensatory education, tuition reimbursement or other out-of-pocket
education-related reimbursement such as tutoring, and injunctive relief. Sch. Comm. of the Town
of Burlington, Mass., 471 U.S. at 369; see, e.g., J.C. v. Vacaville Unified Sch. Dist., No. S-050092 FCD KJM, 2006 WL 2644897, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2006) (ordering cost of
compensatory education to be paid into trust for providing education to student no longer in
district); Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist. v. Frances J., 823 A.2d 249, 258 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003)
(affirming an award of one year’s tuition and fees at a college prep program). But some courts are
less willing to order compensatory or punitive damages under the IDEA. See Sellers v. Sch. Bd.
of Manassas, 141 F.3d 524, 527 (4th Cir. 1998). In addition, the IDEA explicitly provides for
attorney’s fees, but does not otherwise define other types of “appropriate relief.” 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(3).
156. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (2012). Purposes (1)–(4) each explicitly mention “children with
disabilities.”
157. Id. § 1412 (a)(1)(A) (2012) (“A free appropriate public education is available to all
children with disabilities residing in the state.”).
158. Forest Grove, 557 U.S. at 245.
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identifies and treats a child as disabled, denies access to regular education
services, and creates an educational harm. Both actions are rooted in the same
behavior—the school’s obligation to accurately identify and evaluate a child
for a disability. Thus, fairness dictates relief should be made available in both
scenarios.
To put it another way, if a school evaluates Susie for a learning disability
and finds her ineligible for services under the IDEA, Susie (who may or may
not be a child with a disability) is permitted to bring a claim under the IDEA
challenging the school’s eligibility determination. Assuming, Susie has a
learning disability and is harmed by a lack of educational services to address
this disability, she can demand that the school provide her with such services
or compensatory education to bring her up to speed. If, however, we change
the facts and assume Susie is not learning disabled, but the school using
inappropriate or incomplete assessment tools finds that she has a learning
disability, Susie no longer has the right to challenge the school’s actions.
Even where the school’s actions caused Susie harm by removing her from the
general education classroom, she still cannot invoke the IDEA to hold them
accountable. Susie, by virtue of being a child without a disability, is unable
to find a remedy within the IDEA no matter whether the school violated its
responsibility under the statute to accurately identify her and no matter that
this action directly caused Susie an educational harm. Why should the child,
who may or may not have a disability, be entitled to relief under the IDEA,
but a misidentified child, who has been treated as a child with a disability, is
not? Allowing for the two disparate treatments of the same action seems
unjust. Thus, like the Supreme Court in Forest Grove, courts faced with the
obvious inequitable result, could read an implied remedy for children treated
as disabled under the IDEA.
3.

The IDEA Prohibits the Over-identification of African-American
Students

Finally, misidentified minority students have an additional argument
rooted in the historic failure to accurately identify minority youth with
disabilities. The IDEA itself acknowledges this failure several times in the
“Findings” section of the statute.159 Congress also made its concern over the
issue evident when stating, “[g]reater efforts are needed to prevent the
intensifications of problems connected with mislabeling . . . minority children
with disabilities.”160 Moving beyond rhetoric, Congress required states to take
159. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c).
160. H.R. REP. NO. 108-77, at 3 (2003).
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affirmative steps to address the problem. The IDEA requires states to have
“policies and procedures designed to prevent the inappropriate overidentification” of minority children.161 Further, the IDEA explicitly requires
that evaluations not be racially discriminatory. 162 Consequently, the IDEA not
only prohibits racially discriminatory evaluations, but also requires states to
take affirmative steps to address and prevent inappropriate over-identification
of minorities.
The Court in S.H. cited to the IDEA’s mandate that states enact policies
and procedures to address over-identification as the sole way overidentification was to be remedied through the IDEA. 163 This argument is
simply nonsensical when the IDEA also explicitly calls for accurate and
unbiased evaluations.164 While the IDEA’s section on enacting policies to
address over-identification certainly evidences congressional intent to
address the issue, it by no means otherwise limits the obligation that states
already have to ensure accurate and unbiased evaluations nor does it purport
to be the means of addressing the issue. Rather, with the mandate to address
overrepresentation explicitly written into the IDEA, it seems irrational to
presume that Congress would have intended to strip misidentified children of
the right to challenge accurate identification under the very statute that
purports to demand it. The IDEA clearly puts identification and eligibility on
the table by explicitly creating a cause of action for such challenges. Why
then, would Congress demonstrate the will to reduce minority
misidentification and then restrict the ability to raise such claims under the
IDEA? Preventing misidentified minority children from accessing remedies
through the IDEA is clearly at odds with the statute’s stated concerns over
accurate identification of minority children with disabilities.
Despite the IDEA’s concern with misidentification and requirement for
accuracy when assessing for disabilities, the plain language of the statute
operates as a significant obstacle, preventing a misidentified student from
winning relief under the statute. Even assuming a misidentified child had the
right to bring a claim under the IDEA, she likely has no remedy. The statute’s
remedies are clearly interwoven with its stated purpose, which is the
provision of a free appropriate education for children with disabilities. Unless
a court is willing find an implied remedy, arguably supported through the
statute’s demand for accurate identification of disability and requirement that
161. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(24).
162. § 1412(a)(6)(B) (“testing and evaluation materials and procedures utilized for the
purposes of evaluation and placement” must “not be racially or culturally discriminatory”); 20
U.S.C. § 1414(b) (2012) (evaluation procedures).
163. S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 259 n.17 (3d Cir. 2013).
164. See § 1412(a)(6)(B).
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states address inappropriate over-identification, misidentified plaintiffs are
likely stuck with the plain language limiting remedies to “children with
disabilities.”
B.

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal-Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

Finding no solace in the IDEA, misidentified minority students turn to the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 for help.165 The Equal Protection Clause prohibits
states from denying any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the
laws.166 The party alleging discrimination has the burden of proving that the
state’s conduct was motivated by discriminatory purpose. 167 Title VI states,
“[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.”168 Courts have held that Title VI claims are
coextensive with Equal Protection claims based on race.169 In both cases, a
plaintiff must prove intent on the part of defendant. A plaintiff must prove
that a defendant’s actions were motivated by race in order to establish a
violation of either law.170 The Supreme Court has held there is no private
cause of action for disparate impact claims under Title VI. 171 In other words,
a plaintiff cannot use evidence demonstrating that a facially neutral policy or
law has a disproportionate impact on minorities to establish a violation of
Title VI.172 Thus, under either law, plaintiffs must establish intentional
discrimination on the part of a school district in order to get relief. For
misidentified students, this has proven to be an insurmountable summit.
An example of how difficult it is to overcome the burden of establishing
discriminatory intent can be found in the case of Blunt v. Lower Merion
165. See generally Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984); Blunt v. Lower Merion
Sch. Dist., 826 F. Supp. 2d 749 (E.D. Pa. 2011); Bell v. Bd. of Educ. of the Albuquerque Pub.
Schs., No. CIV 06-1137 JB/ACT, 2008 WL 5991062 (D.N.M. Nov. 28, 2008); M.G. v. Crisfield,
547 F. Supp. 2d 399 (D.N.J. 2008); Mrs. M. v. Bridgeport Bd. of Educ., 96 F. Supp. 124 (D.
Conn. 2000).
166. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
167. Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).
169. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003).
170. See E.E.O.C. v. Muhlenberg Coll., 131 F. App’x 807, 812 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating there
must be some evidence that procedural irregularities were related to plaintiff’s race).
171. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291 (2001).
172. Id. at 291–92.
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School District.173 There, a group of current and former African American
students alleged they were improperly identified as disabled by their school
district and subsequently placed in remedial classes.174 Plaintiffs alleged their
identification as learning disabled resulted in removal from the general
education classroom, denial of the opportunity to take more challenging
courses, and prevented them from higher educational achievement.175
Plaintiffs claimed incomplete and inaccurate evaluations led to their
misidentification as children with disabilities.176 They presented statistical
data demonstrating a disproportionate number of African-American students
receiving special education as compared to white students. 177 Over the span
of a five-year period, the percentage of white students in special education
was roughly equivalent to the percentage in the general population; whereas,
the percentage of African-American students in special education was nearly
double their percentage in the general student population.178 To support their
claim of intentional discrimination, plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the
school destroyed testing protocols, failed to obtain parental permission before
conducting evaluations, neglected to notify parents of procedural safeguards
available under the IDEA, omitted information from evaluation reports, and
failed to conduct proper and timely re-evaluations.179 The plaintiffs originally
brought claims under the IDEA, Title VI, and the Equal Protection Clause.180
However, the district court dismissed IDEA claims holding that some
plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and others were
barred by the IDEA’s statute of limitations.181 The defendant school district
brought a motion for summary judgement on the only claims before the
district court, Title VI and the Equal-Protection Clause.182

173. See generally Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 826 F. Supp. 2d 749 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
174. Id. at 753.
175. Id. at 753–58 (plaintiffs introduced evidence demonstrating African-American students
were over-represented in special education courses and completely absent from “high
expectation” college prep or advanced placement classes).
176. Id. at 754.
177. Id. at 756–57 (disproportionality is defined as “significantly greater or lower
participation in special education by one or more groups compared to the participation rates for
other groups”).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 760.
180. Id. at 751.
181. Id. at 752. The IDEA requires plaintiffs who have claims which can be addressed
through the IDEA must exhaust these remedies prior to bringing suit based on these claims in
federal court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f), (g), (i)(2) (2012); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). A number of
exceptions to the exhaustion requirement exist, see infra note 261.
182. Blunt, 826 F. Supp. 2d at 751.
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The district court found for the defendant school district holding that the
plaintiffs had failed to put forth any evidence from which a reasonable
inference could be drawn that the defendant intentionally segregated the
students on the basis of race into inferior educational programs. 183 Essentially,
even assuming the plaintiffs’ allegations to be true, they failed to demonstrate
that the school’s decisions were related to race.184 The court emphasized that
this was not an IDEA action, and unlike under the IDEA, “[p]laintiffs cannot
merely produce evidence that their rights were violated . . . . Instead, they
must raise at least some reasonable inference that they were placed into
[special education classes] and offered services by the School District due to
intentional discrimination based on their race and not simply due to errors in
evaluation.”185 The appellate court affirmed, stating, “[l]ooking at the whole
record, which includes statistical evidence showing that minorities are
overrepresented in low achievement classes, we conclude that there is no
genuine issue of material fact concerning [the School District’s] intent.”186
The Blunt case not only demonstrates the insurmountable obstacles in
place for plaintiffs who attempt to seek recovery for misidentification through
Title VI and the Equal-Protection clause, but also re-emphasizes the futility
of the IDEA in protecting rights of misidentified students. Plaintiffs in this
case presented evidence of stark statistical over-representation of AfricanAmerican students in special education courses, inaccurate and incomplete
evaluations which did not meet professional standards, and a disregard for
parental input and communication; however, none of these facts matter under
Title VI or Equal Protection. Rather, the only thing that matters is whether
plaintiffs can demonstrate that defendant’s actions were motivated by race.
As the Appellate Court held, “[t]here is no sufficient evidence to show that
the educators and administrators responsible for placing students intended to
discriminate against them because of their race.”187 Further, the court refused
to hear claims under the IDEA because of the plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust
administrative remedies under the IDEA. 188 However, as was discussed,
students who attempt to invoke the IDEA for misidentification claims, as

183. Id. at 764.
184. Id. at 764.
185. Id. at 763.
186. Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 257 (3d Cir. 2014).
187. Id. at 294.
188. Id. at 333. “[B]efore the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also
available under this part, the procedures under subsections (f) and (g) shall be exhausted to the
same extent as would be required had the action been brought under this part.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l)
(2012).
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many from the Blunt class action eventually did, are refused because they are
not “children with disabilities.”189
In evaluating the Title VI and Equal-Protection claims, courts focus on
equality of treatment of children regardless of race. 190 Evidence of similarly
situated students who were treated differently, although not dispositive, can
help a plaintiff meet her burden of intent needed to demonstrate a violation
of these anti-discrimination laws.191 On the flip side, Courts embrace
evidence of equality in procedures and evaluations (similarly situated
students being treated equally) as evidence of equal treatment. In other words,
when a school demonstrates that the same testing protocols and evaluations
are used for white students and black students, courts take notice.192
Consequently, courts reason, when all similarly situated students are treated
equally, there is no evidence supporting a violation of either law.193 However,
when it comes to misidentified children, this logic does not necessarily hold
true. Rather, it fails to consider that assessment procedures, in and of
themselves, can be inherently biased. In the case of judgement disabilities,
equality of process does not serve as an adequate measure of equality of
treatment. As previously discussed, subjective observations on the part of an
evaluator, and both implicit and explicit biases, are at the heart of many
judgement disability evaluations, such as the diagnoses of learning disability.
Thus, a focus on equal procedures does not adequately guarantee equality of
treatment. 194 Unfortunately for minority plaintiffs, it appears that courts are
currently unwilling to take a nuanced look at evaluations. As long as that
holds true, unless plaintiffs have evidence of the proverbial “smoking gun,”
189. See generally S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248 (3d Cir.
2013); A.G. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 542 F. App’x. 194 (3d Cir. 2013); Dudley v. Lower
Merion Sch. Dist., No. 10-2749, 2011 WL 5237308 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (court refused to let plaintiff
student amend complaint to include allegations of misidentification because “new” information
that is the basis of misidentification could have been discovered earlier).
190. See Blunt, 826 F. Supp. 2d at 759; Bell v. Bd. of Educ. of the Albuquerque Pub. Schs.,
No. CIV 06-1137 JB/ACT, 2008 WL 5991062, at *5 (D.N.M. Nov. 28, 2008) (court dismissed
plaintiff’s Title VI claim in part because plaintiff failed to present evidence that potentially
disabled black students were subjected to different procedures than potentially disabled white
students).
191. See Meditz v. City of Newark, 658 F.3d 364, 371 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating that gross
statistical disparities may serve to establish a prima facie case in a Title VI discrimination suits).
192. Blunt, 767 F.3d at 276.
193. Id. Chief Judge McKee distinguished between the equality of process and equality of
actual procedures with regard to disability assessment. Blunt, 767 F.3d at 304 (McKee, C.J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part). He took issue with the majority’s opinion because it 1)
assumed the procedures themselves were not discriminatory and 2) ignored “discretion and
subjectivity” on the part of the evaluator. Id.
194. Nicole M. Oelrich, A New “Idea”: Ending Racial Disparity in the Identification of
Students with Emotional Disturbance, 57 S.D. L. REV. 9, 28 (2012).
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they will inevitably fail to demonstrate the requisite intent under Title VI or
the Equal Protection Clause regardless of the depth and breadth of their
circumstantial evidence.195
C.

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act
1. An Overview of Section 504 and Title II of the ADA

Misidentified students may also seek relief through Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section 504) and Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (Title II).196 Unlike Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause,
Section 504 and Title II cover all students, regardless of race, so long as they
meet the relevant definition of disability and were subjected to discrimination
on the basis of disability. 197 Section 504 was the first broad federal statute to
prohibit discrimination against the disabled, stating “[n]o otherwise qualified
individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability,
be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance . . . .”198 Despite this broad language, Section 504 did
little to advance the cause of equality of treatment for the disabled.199
Consequently, the ADA was enacted to “provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities.”200 Title II of the ADA was based in large part on Section
195. Blunt, 826 F. Supp. 2d at 761; see also People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ. Sch.
Dist. No. 205, 111 F.3d 528, 536 (7th Cir. 1997); Quarles v. Oxford Mun. Separate Sch. Dist.,
868 F. 2d 750, 754-55 (5th Cir. 1989) (upholding ability-grouping programs that
disproportionately placed minority students in low tracks); Ga. State Conference of Branches of
NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1418 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding tracking did not violate Title
VI because it was an “accepted pedagogical practice”); Losen & Welner, supra note 1, at 434.
196. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990);
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355 (1973). The ADA has several
additional sections. Title I prohibits discrimination against the disabled in employment. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101–12108. Title III applies to places of public accommodations, including private entities
if they affect commerce. Id. §§ 12301–12310. However, when this article refers to the “ADA” it
is referring specifically to Title II of the ADA unless otherwise indicated.
197. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2012).
198. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
199. Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64
TEMP. L. REV. 393, 394 (1991).
200. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1); see also Nancy Lee Jones, Overview and Essential
Requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 471, 479 (1991).
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504, with Title II regulations patterned after Section 504 regulations.201 Both
operate as nondiscrimination statutes and bar organizations from
discriminating against persons with disabilities for reasons related to their
disabilities.202 Section 504 is limited to any program or activity receiving
federal funds and Title II extends this prohibition to all public
organizations.203 Thus, both statutes apply to public schools. In addition, both
define disability similarly as 1) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities; 2) having a record
of such an impairment; or 3) being regarded as having such an impairment.204
This definition of disability is substantially broader than the IDEA’s
definition and thus, generally speaking, a child who is eligible for services
under the IDEA will usually qualify for services under either Section 504 or
Title II of the ADA.205
In the context of disabled students, although both are considered antidiscrimination statutes and protect negative rights—the right to be left
alone—they also create affirmative rights, benefits gained by those who are
eligible for statutory protections. Section 504 regulations require schools to
provide a free appropriate public education to each child covered by Section
504.206 The Section 504 regulations define appropriate education as:
the provision of regular or special education and related aids and
services that (i) are designed to meet individual educational needs
of handicapped persons as adequately as the needs of
nonhandicapped persons are met and (ii) are based upon adherence
201. The regulations under Section 504 and the ADA must be “consistent” with each other.
42 U.S.C. § 12134(b) (2012). Courts may not construe the provision of the ADA “to apply to a
lesser standard than the standards applied under [Section 504] or the regulations issued by Federal
agencies pursuant” to Section 504. Id. § 12201(a). The regulations pursuant to Title II of the ADA
are found at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, and the regulations under Section 504 are found at 28 C.F.R. pt. 42,
subpart G.
202. Title II of the ADA states, in part, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132; see also 29 U.S.C. § 794.
203. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
204. § 794(a); § 12132.
205. Mark C. Weber, A New Look at Section 504 and the ADA in Special Education Cases,
16 TEX. J. ON C. L. & C.R. 1, 24 (2010). The ADA Amendments Act, passed in 2008, reaffirmed
the broad definition of disability, stating disability “shall be construed in favor of broad coverage
of individuals,” and declares that the intent of Congress is “that the primary object of attention in
cases brought under the ADA should be whether entities covered under the ADA have complied
with their obligations,” rather than whether the claimant’s impairment meets the definition of a
disability. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(2)–(5), 122 Stat. 3553,
3554 (2008).
206. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33 (2010).
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to procedures that satisfy the requirements of [other regulations
related to: academic setting, evaluation and placement, and
procedural safeguards]. 207

It is well-settled that both statutes not only prohibit discrimination, but
also require reasonable accommodations when necessary to ensure disabled
children have equal access to educational opportunity. 208 Although there are
some differences between Section 504 and Title II, the statutes are
sufficiently similar to warrant discussing them together. The following
section will discuss claims under both statutes in the educational context.
2.
a.

Misidentification Claims Under Section 504 and Title II of the
ADA

Prima Facie Case

In order to establish a claim under Section 504 or Title II, a plaintiff must
establish that she: 1) is an individual with a disability; 2) is otherwise
qualified to receive the benefit; and 3) was denied the benefits of the program
or otherwise subjected to discrimination because of her disability. 209 Section
504 has an additional prong of establishing that the program in question
receives federal financial assistance.210 Unlike the IDEA, Section 504 and
Title II have broader definitions of disability which include anyone who is
“regarded as” having a disability. 211 A student meets the “regarded as”
definition if she has been subjected to a prohibited action “because of an
actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the
impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.” 212
When applying these three prongs to misidentified students, it appears that
they would easily be able to state a prima facie case for discrimination under
either statute. Misidentified students will have no trouble meeting the first
prong of the standard, as schools are identifying and treating them as
disabled. Prong two is also not at issue as most students are “qualified” to
participate in school. Prong three is met if a student can show that she was
denied the benefits of an education program or subject to different treatment
because of her perceived disability. Again, this prong seems easy to establish
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
7.

34 C.F.R. §104.33(a), (b)(1).
Id. §§ 104.4, 104.34; 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2015).
Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 253 (3d Cir. 1999).
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012).
29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012).
ADA Amendments Act § 3(3)(A). For provisions that apply to the ADA, see ADAA §
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because the essence of a misidentified student’s claim is different treatment
based on perceived disability. Plaintiffs generally allege schools place them
in lower-achieving classes based on perceived disability which results in
educational harm. Consequently, it seems that a misidentified student can
quite convincingly allege violations of Section 504 and Title II. Thus, the
school must do something in response. The more difficult task is defining
what that “something” is. Is it enough for schools to simply stop treating the
misidentified students as disabled and allow them to take regular education
courses,213 or are schools obligated to provide some type of equitable relief,
or even compensatory damages? The following sections will address the
unsettled question of what, if anything, schools must do for misidentified
children.
b.

Remedies Under Section 504 or Title II of the ADA

Plaintiffs who have been harmed through misidentification seek remedies
to help make them whole. It is well established that private parties may seek
remedies under both Section 504 and Title II.214 The trouble is, Congress did
not clearly define remedies under either Title II or Section 504, but rather
referenced and incorporated other statutes to define remedies. Title II states
that its remedies shall be those contained in Section 505 of the Rehabilitation
Act.215 Section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act states that Section 504 remedies
are coextensive with those remedies in Title VI. 216 Based on this statutory
language, the Supreme Court has stated, “the remedies for violations of [Title
II] of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are coextensive with

213. As subsequent sections will illustrate, schools benefit by not contesting a student’s claim
that she is not disabled because when a student is not disabled, the school does not have a statutory
obligation to serve them. Further, it appears that the school can escape liability under the IDEA,
Section 504, and the ADA when the plaintiff is not disabled.
214. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185 (2002) (finding that a private right of action exists
under both statutes, but bars punitive damages for private causes of action); Mark H. v. Lemahieu,
513 F.3d 922, 930 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding Section 504 includes an implied private right of action
allowing victims of prohibited discrimination, exclusion or denial of benefits to seek the full
panoply of remedies, including equitable relief and compensatory damages); Rodgers v. Magnet
Cove Pub. Sch., 34 F.3d 642, 645 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding private right of action for monetary
damages exists under Section 504); Carter v. Orleans Parish Pub. Sch., 725 F.2d 261, 262 (4th
Cir. 1984) (finding personal cause of action to people excluded based on perceived disability).
215. The ADA states, “[t]he remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in [Section 504] shall
be the remedies, procedures, and rights this subchapter provides to any person alleging
discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of section 12132.” 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2012).
216. Section 505 states, “[t]he remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . shall be available to any person aggrieved by any act or failure to
act by any recipient of Federal assistance . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (2012).
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the remedies available in a private cause of action under [Title VI].” 217 Thus,
appellate courts analyzing cases under Section 504 or Title II have looked to
Title VI to define available remedies.
Title VI does not, in fact, contain a remedies provision; however, there
exists a complicated body of jurisprudence setting forth the framework for
Title VI remedies. At the root of this framework is the Supreme Court’s
holding that private individuals seeking compensatory damages under Title
VI must prove intentional discrimination.218 Consequently, appellate courts
analyzing Title II and Section 504 cases incorporate the Title VI intent
standard when plaintiffs seek compensatory damages. 219 Several scholars
have criticized the application of Title VI’s intent standard to Section 504 and
Title II of the ADA; 220 nonetheless, all appellate courts that have considered
the issue in the context of education cases have held that plaintiffs must prove
intent in order to win compensatory damages.221 At the same time, courts have
also held that plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief—relief that is not monetary
in nature, but rather asks the court to force defendant to comply with the

217. Barnes, 536 U.S. at 185.
218. Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 593 (1983); see also
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); Derek Black, Picking Up the Pieces After Alexander
v. Sandoval: Resurrecting A Private Cause of Action for Disparate Impact, 81 N.C. L. REV. 356,
357 (2002).
219. S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 263 (3d Cir. 2013); T.W.
ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cty., 610 F.3d 588, 603–04 (11th Cir. 2010); Loeffler v.
Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 582 F.3d 268, 275 (2d Cir. 2009); Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922,
938 (9th Cir. 2008); Nieves–Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 126 (1st Cir. 2003).
220. Sande Buhai & Nina Golden, Adding Insult to Injury: Discriminatory Intent as a
Prerequisite to Damages Under the ADA, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 1121, 1133 (2000); Nina Golden,
Compounding the Error: “Deliberate Indifference” vs. “Discriminatory Animus” Under Title II
of the ADA, 23 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 227, 253 (2003); Mark Weber, Accidentally on Purpose: Intent
in Disability Discrimination Law, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1417, 1417 (2015).
221. Meagley v. City of Little Rock, 639 F.3d 384, 389 (8th Cir. 2011) (“The ADA was
modeled on the Rehabilitation Act, which had been modeled after Title VI, so it follows rationally
that the rights and remedies afforded under both statutes should be governed by Title VI
precedent.”); T.W., 610 F.3d at 603–04; Loeffler, 582 F.3d at 275; Mark H., 513 F.3d at 938; Bd.
of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 211 v. Ross, 486 F.3d 267, 278 (7th Cir. 2007); Nieves–
Marquez, 353 F.3d at 126 (“[P]rivate individuals may recover compensatory damages under §
504 . . . only for intentional discrimination.”); Delano–Pyle v. Victoria Cty., 302 F.3d 567, 574
(5th Cir. 2002) (“A plaintiff asserting a private cause of action for violations of the ADA or the
RA may only recover compensatory damages upon a showing of intentional discrimination.”);
Powers v. MJB Acquisition Corp., 184 F.3d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that a claim for
compensatory damages under the RA “requires proof the defendant has intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff”); Pandazides v. Va. Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 823, 830 n.9 (4th
Cir. 1994) (acknowledging that recovery of damages under the RA requires a finding of
intentional discrimination).
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law—do not need to prove intentional discrimination.222 Because courts often
conflate the standard for injunctive relief with that of compensatory relief,
the next section will parse out a claim of injunctive relief under Section 504
or Title II.
c.

Injunctive Relief Under Section 504 or Title II of the ADA

Plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief through Section 504 and Title II would
first need to establish a violation of the statutes. The question of what a statute
prohibits is distinct from the question of what remedies might be available
when a defendant violates those prohibitions.223 The standard for establishing
liability is distinct from the question of allowable remedies. 224 For instance, a
statute might prohibit a particular action or result and permit a plaintiff to sue,
regardless of a defendant’s intent, when this action or result occurs. But that
same statute might only allow for monetary damages when a defendant
intentionally engaged in the practice or intended the result. Although liability
and damages obviously intersect, they should be treated distinctly.
Many courts, however, fail to distinguish between liability and remedies
and jump straight to Section 504 remedies language, assuming that intent is
required both to justify monetary damages and when making out a basic
violation of Section 504 and Title II. 225 This is simply the wrong analysis.226
Neither the text of Section 504 or Title II impose an intent standard to
establish a violation of either statute. Rather, the plain language of the statutes
indicates that as long as a plaintiff can establish she: 1) is disabled within the
meaning of the statute; 2) would otherwise qualify for services; and 3) was
222. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 253 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding
plaintiff need not prove intentional discrimination to establish a violation of Section 504 based
on allegations that school failed to identify his learning disability and provide him with FAPE);
J.T. ex rel. Harvell v. Mo. State Bd. of Educ., No. 4:08CV1431RWS, 2009 WL 262094, at *7
(E.D. Mo. Feb. 4, 2009); Neena S. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. CIV. A. 05-5404, 2008 WL
5273546, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2008); Lower Merion Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 931 A.2d 640, 644
(Pa. 2007).
223. Injunctive relief is not a proper claim for relief in and of itself, but rather a remedy that
is available upon a finding of liability on a claim. Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 424
F.3d 1117, 1127 (11th Cir. 2005).
224. See Mark H., 513 F.3d at 938 (“For purposes of determining whether a particular
regulation is ever enforceable through the implied right of action contained in a statute, the
pertinent question is simply whether the regulation falls within the scope of the statute’s
prohibition. The mens rea necessary to support a damages remedy is not pertinent at that stage of
the analysis. It becomes essential, instead, in determining whether damages can actually be
imposed in an individual case.”).
225. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
226. Mark C. Weber, Procedures and Remedies Under Section 504 and the ADA for Public
School Children with Disabilities, 32 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 611, 627–28 (2012).
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denied the benefits of the program or otherwise subjected to discrimination
because of her disability, she is entitled to relief.227 An individual can be
impermissibly denied the benefits of a program, regardless of whether that
was the defendant’s intent. In this respect, these statutory requirements are
aimed at the effect of harm, not the motivation of the actor.
When Section 504 or Title II have been violated, plaintiffs, regardless of
intent, have the right to bring a cause of action and can secure equitable or
injunctive relief.228 Courts have ordered equitable relief in the form of
compensatory education,229 occupational therapy services,230 ongoing
educational services,231 and tuition reimbursement.232 Further, several courts
have determined that plaintiffs are not required to prove intent in order to win
injunctive relief.233 Rather, plaintiffs can win injunctive relief by
demonstrating a violation of the Act.234 As the Third Circuit recently
explained, a plaintiff “need not prove deliberate indifference to obtain
declaratory, injunctive, or equitable relief under the Rehabilitation Act,” she
need only “establish that the District is liable under the Act based on a failure
227. See supra Part III (C)(2)(a) discussing prima facie case for relief under Section 504 or
Title II of the ADA.
228. Mark H., 513 F.3d at 935 (holding Section 504 includes an implied private right of
action allowing victims of prohibited discrimination, exclusion or denial of benefits to seek the
full panoply of remedies, including equitable relief and compensatory damages); see also Mark
C. Weber, Disability Discrimination by State and Local Government: The Relationship Between
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 36 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1089 (1995).
229. Neena S. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. CIV. A. 05-5404, 2008 WL 5273546, at *14 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 19, 2008).
230. Lower Merion Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 931 A.2d 640, 644 (Pa. 2007).
231. J.T. ex rel. Harvell v. Mo. State Bd. of Educ., No. 4:08CV1431RWS, 2009 WL 262094,
at *7 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 4, 2009).
232. Bd. of Educ. v. F.C. ex rel. R.C., 2 F. Supp. 2d 637, 643 (D.N.J. 1998) (finding plaintiffs
would not need to prove intent to sustain injunctive relief requiring school to pay for private
tuition and transportation).
233. K.K. ex rel. L.K. v. Pittsburgh Pub. Sch., 590 F. App’x 148, 153 (3d Cir. 2014)
(“Although K.K. need not prove deliberate indifference to obtain declaratory, injunctive, or
equitable relief under the Rehabilitation Act, she must still establish that the District is liable
under the Act based on a failure ‘to ensure meaningful participation in educational activities and
meaningful access to educational benefits.’”); Washington v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 181
F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 1999); McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 119 F.3d 453, 460 (6th
Cir. 1997); Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480, 1483–84 (9th Cir. 1996); Helen L. v. DiDario,
46 F.3d 325, 334 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding plaintiff did not need to prove intentional discrimination
in a reasonable accommodations case); Norcross v. Sneed, 755 F.2d 113, 117 n.4 (8th Cir. 1985);
Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1385 (10th Cir. 1981); Prewitt v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 306 (5th Cir. 1981); Bd. of Educ., 2 F. Supp. 2d at 637 (finding
plaintiffs would not need to prove intent to sustain injunctive relief requiring school to pay for
private tuition and transportation).
234. See sources cited supra note 233.
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‘to ensure meaningful participation in educational activities and meaningful
access to educational benefits.’”235 Other courts frame the issue slightly
differently but acknowledge the same point: intent is not required for
injunctive relief.
The Seventh Circuit, for instance, divided disability claims into different
categories, writing that a plaintiff can establish violation of Section 504 or
Title II with “evidence that (1) the defendant intentionally acted on the basis
of the disability, (2) the defendant refused to provide a reasonable
modification, or (3) the defendant's rule disproportionally impacts disabled
people.”236 The important point here is that although some disability
discrimination may include intent, the court rejected the notion “that liability
under [Title II] must be premised on an intent to discriminate on the basis of
disability.”237 Rather, the court affirmed that plaintiffs making claims under
the Rehabilitation Act need not prove an impermissible intent. 238 Thus,
discrimination can be demonstrated through means other than impermissible
intent, such as failure to provide a reasonable accommodation or disparate
impact.
Despite the plain language of statute and the foregoing precedent, some
courts have required plaintiffs to prove intent, even when plaintiffs are only
seeking injunctive relief.239 This flawed analysis is largely a product of the
fact that the remedies section of both statutes are intertwined with Title VI.240
In the context of Title VI, courts have held that plaintiffs must establish intent
for all violations and remedies.241 Thus, with Title VI, the violation and
remedy can potentially be collapsed. While the Section 504 and Title II
remedies are connected to Title VI, the violation of the Acts is entirely
distinct. The Supreme Court’s holding in Alexander v. Choate makes this
distinction clear.242
235. Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 280 (3d Cir. 2012).
236. Washington, 181 F.3d at 847 (adopting rule from McPherson, 119 F.3d at 460).
237. Id. at 846.
238. Id.
239. M.P. ex rel. K. & D.P. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 721, 439 F.3d 865, 867 (8th Cir. 2006)
(finding that plaintiff “must also show bad faith or gross misjudgment to make a successful
Section 504 violation claim”).
240. The ADA states that its remedies shall be those contained in Section 505 of the
Rehabilitation Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2012). Section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act states that
Section 504 remedies are coextensive with those remedies in Title VI. Based on this statutory
language, the Supreme Court has stated, “the remedies for violations of [Title II] of the ADA and
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are coextensive with the remedies available in a private
cause of action under [Title VI].” Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185 (2002).
241. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 282–83 (2001).
242. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 309 (1985). In Alexander v. Choate, a plaintiff class
of Medicaid recipients sued the State of Tennessee claiming the State’s proposed legislation to
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In Choate, the Court acknowledged that Title VI jurisprudence established
an intent requirement. That is, plaintiff’s seeking to establish a violation of
Title VI’s prohibition on race discrimination must prove that the defendant’s
actions were motivated by race. However, the Court declined to extend Title
VI’s intent requirement to Section 504.243 To the contrary, the Court indicated
that Section 504’s prohibition on disability discrimination extended to some,
unintentional actions—or disparate impacts.244 The Court emphasized that
“much of the conduct that Congress sought to alter in passing the
Rehabilitation Act would be difficult if not impossible to reach were the Act
construed to proscribe only conduct fueled by a discriminatory intent.”245
Moreover, when Section 504 was first enacted Title VI was widely
interpreted as prohibiting unintentional actions or disparate impacts. Had
Congress wanted to limit Section 504’s reach to only intentional actions, it
would have explicitly written that into the law rather than incorporate a law
that at the time was interpreted as prohibiting unintentional acts.246 Given the
issues before the Court, it did not, however, establish a bright line test to
determine which instances of disparate impact were prohibited. It only
rejected the direct application of Title VI’s intent jurisprudence to limit
Section 504’s reach.247
Choate’s analysis of Section 504’s prohibition on unintentional acts of
discrimination remains unchanged. Lower courts miss the import of Choate
and focus entirely on the fact Section 504 is modeled after Title VI in
important structural respects. But Choate’s analysis aside, the nature of
disability discrimination is distinct from race discrimination and, thus, Title
VI holdings cannot be blindly carried over to Section 504. Although Section
504’s language is almost identical to Title VI’s language, legislative history
reveals that Congress intended the statutes to address two very different types
of discrimination.
reduce the number of inpatient hospital days that Medicaid would cover was a violation of Section
504. Id. at 287. The issue before the court was whether Section 504 prohibited unintentional acts
that had the effect of discrimination on the disabled, referred to as “disparate impact.” Id. at 289.
243. The Court declined to extend Title VI intent to Section 504 for three reasons: 1) unlike
Title VI, section 504 clearly prohibits some forms of disparate impact; 2) legal underpinnings
related to the Title VI intent analysis have no bearing on Section 504 analysis; 3) when Section
504 was modeled after Title VI, Title VI was widely interpreted as barring actions with disparate
impact. Id. at 293–98. Had Congress wanted Section 504 to be limited to only intentional
discrimination and not disparate impact, it would have expressly written that language into the
act. Id.; see also Weber, supra note 220, at 1441.
244. Choate, 469 U.S. at 299.
245. Id. at 296–97.
246. Id. at 294 n.11; see also Weber, supra note 220, at 1441.
247. Choate, 469 U.S. at 299.
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Section 504 was a response to “previous societal neglect” intended to
remedy “the country’s ‘shameful oversights’ which caused the handicapped
to live among society ‘shunted aside, hidden and ignored.’” 248 Unlike race
discrimination, the emphasis in disability discrimination was on benign
neglect borne from ignorance rather than ill will. Decades later, Title II of the
ADA sought to extend those same concerns beyond government entities
receiving federal financial assistance to all public entities. 249 The clearest
indication of Congress’s intent to address not just intentional discrimination,
but neglect is the fact that both the ADA and Rehabilitation Act affirmatively
require public entities to make reasonable accommodations in order to ensure
equal access by the disabled.250 Covered entities are required to make these
accommodations and are liable for the failure to do so regardless of whether
or not there was an intent to discriminate against the disabled.251 For example,
the reasonable accommodations mandate requires that schools ensure that
physically disabled students have access to classrooms. When determining
whether or not a school must make changes in order to allow equal access,
intent is not a factor. Thus, a reviewing court does not need to hear any
evidence regarding whether or not the school intended to prevent access, but
need only worry about whether the disabled student does in fact have access,
and if not, does the school’s decision to not accommodate fall under the limits
allowed by the statutes.252
In sum, that the statutory text of Section 504 and Title II incorporate the
remedies of Title VI tells us nothing of what activities Section 504 and Title
248. Id. at 296.
249. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1990).
250. Title II of the ADA directs the federal government to promulgate regulations to
implement the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12134. The implementing regulations prohibit disability
discrimination and require public entities to make reasonable accommodations for disabled
persons. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(a) (2015) (“A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in
policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination
on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications
would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.”); 28 C.F.R.
§ 35.130(b)(7). Similarly, section 504 regulations state “A recipient shall make reasonable
accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
handicapped applicant or employee unless the recipient can demonstrate that the accommodation
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program.” 28 C.F.R. § 41.53.
251. See, e.g., Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 597 (1999) (upholding finding of
discrimination under the ADA against mental patients who were institutionalized rather than
given community placements as failure to reasonably accommodate despite lack of intent to
discriminate on part of state agency); see also Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 333 (3d Cir.
1995) (finding plaintiff did not need to prove intentional discrimination in a reasonable
accommodations case where issue was whether plaintiff should be allowed to receive in-home
care).
252. Id.
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II prohibit. Congressional intent, Choate, and numerous lower court decisions
establish that Section 504 and Title II prohibit unintentional acts. The
incorporation of Title IV remedies simply means that plaintiffs can sue for
those violations and enjoin prohibited acts when necessary. Those courts
holding or suggesting otherwise simply confuse statutory violations with
statutory remedies.
IV.

A.

DRAWING A FOUL: FINDING A REMEDY FOR MISIDENTIFICATION
UNDER SECTION 504 AND TITLE II OF THE ADA
The Promise of Injunctive Remedies under Section 504 and Title II
of the ADA

Litigation around misidentified children has largely focused on
compensatory relief253; however, with the right class of plaintiffs, injunctive
relief could be a powerful tool toward curbing misidentification of minorities.
A misidentified student should be able to state a successful claim for
injunctive relief. Such a student could make a prima facie case by showing:
1) she was “regarded as” having a disability, 2) she was otherwise qualified
to participate in school, 3) she was denied the benefits of the educational
program or otherwise subjected to discrimination because of her perceived
disabilities.254 A misidentified student is “regarded as” disabled if she has
been subjected to a prohibited action “because of an actual or perceived
physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is
perceived to limit a major life activity.” 255 Given this broad language, the
misidentified student clearly fits within the “regarded as” category. The
student’s entire claim centers around the fact that the school treated her
differently due to a perceived disability. The misidentified student will also
easily be able to demonstrate that she was qualified to participate in school.
Finally, the student must prove she was denied benefits of the educational
program or subject to discrimination on the basis of her disability. Facts such
as being scheduled for lower-achieving courses, being denied the opportunity
for regular education courses and any other different treatment stemming
from her perceived disability will help meet this prong. When analyzing such
a case, a court’s focus should be on the effect of a school’s actions, rather
253. See sources cited supra note 222.
254. To state a claim under section 504, they would also need to establish that the school
received federal funding. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012).
255. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A)(2012).
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than intent or motive. Did the school’s actions have the effect of denying
plaintiff benefits of a program based on a perceived disability? If so, the
plaintiff should be entitled to a remedy.
Once that showing is made, a court would have broad authority to fashion
appropriate remedies under either statute.256 A likely remedy for an individual
student may be an award of compensatory educational services meant to
bring the student up to speed on material he or she may have missed due to
inappropriate placement in low achieving courses. A likely remedy for a class
of misidentified students may be enjoining the school from continuing to use
the same identification and evaluation procedures that misidentified the
students to begin with, and requiring the school to adopt new evaluation
protocols to guard against misidentification of minority students with
disabilities. Such a remedy could have far reaching effects for minority
students experiencing misidentification.
Systemically reforming the identification process to one that is more
accurate and unbiased would likely require class based claims, rather than
individual claims. While both would need to establish the same
straightforward prima facie case, certifying the class itself may present
significant challenges. In particular, identifying and establishing the class of
plaintiffs will be difficult because the class is premised on a group of children
who are not actually disabled but may currently believe they are. In other
words, they are unaware of their erroneous misidentification as “disabled.”
Further, meeting the “commonality” requirement—that there are “questions
of law or fact common to the class” has become much more difficult in light
of recent Supreme Court ruling articulating a “heightened commonality”
standard.257
To date, class actions brought by minority students claiming
misidentification have also contained claims of mislabeling. That is, certain
plaintiffs concede that they have disabilities, but allege the school mislabeled
them with the wrong disability category resulting in unlawful discrimination
and educational harm.258 In Mrs. M. v. Bridgeport Board of Education, a class
256. The Supreme Court has articulated the general rule that “absent clear direction to the
contrary by Congress, the federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief in a
cognizable cause of action brought pursuant to a federal statute.” Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub.
Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 70–71 (1992).
257. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining
Access to Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441, 442 (2013).
258. Although the IDEA is not concerned about category, if plaintiff can demonstrate she is
not receiving appropriate services due to a mislabeled disability, she may be able to successfully
state a claim for injunctive relief under either the IDEA or section 504 and the ADA. See supra
Section II.A.2; Bell v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Sch., No. CIV 06-1137 JB/ACT, 2008
WL 5991062 (D.N.M. Nov. 28, 2008).
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of minority students brought suit under Section 504, the ADA, and the EqualProtection Clause asserting that the school district engaged in the practice of
over-identifying Latino students as mentally retarded at a rate of over three
times the national average and subsequently failing to provide these students
with an appropriate education.259 The Connecticut District Court dismissed
the claims of the class for failure to exhaust administrative claims under the
IDEA prior to asserting federal claims.260 Plaintiffs with claims of both
misidentification and mislabeling were required to exhaust remedies under
the IDEA prior to bringing Section 504 and Title II claims, unless they meet
one of the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. The IDEA requires
plaintiffs to first exhaust the state administrative remedies provided under the
IDEA before seeking “remedies available under the Constitution, [S]ection
504, the ADA or other federal laws protecting the rights of children with
disabilities.”261 The plaintiffs in the Connecticut case failed to meet one of the
exceptions to exhaustion and thus, their claim failed.262 The court held that
plaintiffs claim of illegal over-identification ultimately could be remedied
individually through IDEA’s administrative process.263 “Although the
plaintiffs in this case have alleged that the [School District] engages in a
pattern and practice of illegally over-identifying minority school children as
mentally retarded, such a pattern or practice is subject to review by [sic]
hearing officers on a case-by-case basis.”264
259. Mrs. M. v. Bridgeport Bd. of Educ., 96 F. Supp. 2d 124, 127 (D. Conn. 2000).
260. Id.
261. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2012). “[B]efore the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking
relief that is also available under this subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f) and (g) of
this section shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been brought
under this subchapter.” Id.
262. “The dispute over exhaustion reduces to one issue: whether there is a meaningful
administrative enforcement mechanism for the vindication of personal rights . . . . It is a wellestablished principle of administrative law that exhaustion is not required if the only available
administrative remedy is plainly inadequate.” Riley v. Ambach, 668 F.2d 635, 641 (2d Cir. 1981).
One court summarized the recognized exceptions to exhaustion as follows: exhaustion is not
required when “(1) it would be futile to use the due process procedures [required by the IDEA] . . .
; (2) an agency has adopted a policy or pursued a practice of general applicability that is contrary
to the law; [or] (3) it is improbable that adequate relief can be obtained by pursuing administrative
remedies (e.g., the hearing officer lacks the authority to grant the relief sought).” Mrs. W. v.
Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748, 756 (2d Cir. 1987).
263. “[T]he Court determines that the plaintiffs’ complaint in essence presents a challenge to
the identification decisions made by the BBE with respect to certain children and not to the actual
framework under which the identification decisions were made. In other words, their challenge
really is to the substantive determinations reached by the BBE concerning certain children, not to
the structure of the system under which the identification was made.” Mrs. M., 96 F. Supp. 2d at
133.
264. Mrs. M., 96 F. Supp. 2d at 130–31.
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Fortunately, a class consisting only of students who were misidentified for
disabilities when they had none, would not be bound by IDEA’s
administrative exhaustion requirement. Since courts have held that
misidentified students, by virtue of not being “children with disabilities” have
no right to invoke IDEA’s procedural protections, they could proceed directly
with Section 504 and Title II claims.265 Based on this reasoning, it would seem
that a class of minority students seeking to challenge identification
procedures under Section 504 and the ADA may have a strong chance of
successfully acquiring injunctive relief. And injunctive relief, more than any
other remedy, offers the best chance of improving the evaluation process.
This approach, however, has not taken hold, primarily for practical reasons.
To date, many of the claims of misidentification have not been brought or
heard by courts until after a student has already graduated from high school.
At that point, remedial services offered by the school are not useful. Thus,
these plaintiffs ask for compensatory damages. Moreover, because
compensatory damages are generally thought to be unavailable under the
IDEA, but are clearly permitted by Section 504 and the ADA, these claims
have all been funneled solely through Section 504 and the ADA. 266 For these
individual plaintiffs, monetary damages are clearly important, but they are
not necessarily important to a broader and more impactful remedy of
injunctive relief for a class of minority students. If the goal is systemic reform
rather than individual remedies, the best strategy would be to avoid the issue
of compensatory damages altogether. However, given the difficulties
establishing an appropriate class, individual cases for compensatory damages
may be the only viable option. Such individual claims, in greater numbers,
could also incentivize schools toward reforming their identification processes
as a way to avoid the potential costs associated with liability. Thus, the
following section will analyze misidentification cases seeking compensatory
damages.
B.

Compensatory Damages and the Intent Requirement

While the question of the general liability standard for Section 504 and the
ADA and the subsequent availability of injunctive relief should be
straightforward, the question of the appropriate standard for compensatory
265. See supra discussion in Part III.A.
266. Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 256 (3d Cir. 2014) cert. denied sub
nom. Allston v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 135 S. Ct. 1738 (2015); A.G. v. Lower Merion Sch.
Dist., 542 F. App’x 194 (3d Cir. 2013); S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d
248 (3d Cir. 2013).
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damages is more complex and less certain. Here the question is not simply
whether the defendant must stop violating the statute and structure its
education program to fix the discrimination, the question is whether the
defendant might also be required to pay a plaintiff for the harm it caused. On
this question, most courts hold that plaintiffs must establish intent to receive
compensatory damages. The rationale for this holding rests on two distinct
points 1) the incorporation of Title VI remedies into Section 504 and by
extension Title II of the ADA and 2) notice requirements attached to spending
clause legislation. Each will be discussed in turn.
1. The Long Arm of the Title VI Intent Doctrine
To date, most courts interpreting Section 504 and Title II have held that
plaintiffs seeking compensatory damages under either statute must prove
intent.267 That is, they must demonstrate that the defendant intended to
discriminate against the plaintiff because of their disability. Interestingly,
Congress did not clearly require “intent” to establish a violation in the
language of either statute. As stated above, Congress did not clearly define
remedies under the ADA or Section 504, but rather incorporated remedies
contained in Title VI. Consequently, courts have incorporated Title VI’s
intent requirement into Section 504 and the ADA. However, several scholars
have criticized this analysis and for good reason. 268 As discussed above, the
Supreme Court declined to limit Section 504 to intentional acts of
discrimination, noting the differences between Title VI and Section 504 as
well as the distinctions between race and disability discrimination.269
Unfortunately, lower courts analyzing Section 504 and ADA claims for
compensatory damages give weight to the language contained in Section 504
which incorporates remedies of Title VI without reaching back to Choate for
its cautionary language warning against conflating Title VI and Section 504.
Rather than relying on Choate, they look to another Supreme Court case,
Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission of New York City, for the
proposition that Title VI is limited to acts of intentional discrimination. 270 In
other words, they employ the following analysis. Section 504 incorporates by
reference the remedies contained in Title VI. Title VI is limited to acts of
intentional discrimination; therefore, Section 504 is limited to acts of
267. See, e.g., Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 826 F. Supp. 2d 749, 759 (2011).
268. Golden & Buhai, supra note 220, at 1135–36; Weber, supra note 220, at 1419.
269. See supra Section III.D. and accompanying discussion of Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S.
287 (1985).
270. Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 597 (1983).
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intentional discrimination.271 This analysis fails to incorporate the careful
analysis in Choate which clearly states that “Guardians . . . does not support
[the] blanket proposition that federal law proscribes only intentional
discrimination against the handicapped.”272 Rather the Court acknowledged
the differences in disability discrimination and race discrimination and with
that the differences in the legislation enacted to combat each one. Professor
Mark Weber clearly explains the misapplication as follows: “Guardians
Association barred monetary relief for disparate impact discrimination
because the statute—Title VI itself—outlawed only intentional
discrimination. Its holding is not relevant when a statute [Section 504], as
authoritatively interpreted by its regulations, forbids disparate impact
discrimination.”273
The other Supreme Court case directly exploring the reach of Section 504
and ADA remedies is Barnes v. Gorman.274 In Barnes, the Supreme Court
held that punitive damages may not be awarded in private suits brought under
the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.275 The Court’s discussion
focused on the scope of Spending Clause legislation. It held that SpendingClause legislation only allows for relief if the recipient of federal funding is
on notice that, by accepting the funds, it exposes itself to certain liability. 276
The Court acknowledged that “a recipient of federal funds is nevertheless
subject to suit for compensatory damages” as they are traditionally available
in breach of contract claims. Consequently, the Court held that since the
remedies provisions of Section 504 and Title II of the ADA are tied to Title
VI, which is Spending-Clause legislation, the former are limited to
compensatory damages and do not allow for punitive damages. Barnes did
not over-rule Choate’s previous holding regarding the scope of Section 504’s
prohibited conduct, nor did it speak to the issue of intent at all. Rather, the
Court in Barnes was focused on the scope of remedies and the unavailability
of punitive damages for spending clause legislation.277 Thus, Barnes stands
for the proposition that remedies of Spending-Clause legislation are limited

271. See generally S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248 (3d Cir.
2013).
272. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 294 (1985) (emphasis added).
273. Weber, supra note 220, at 1447.
274. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002).
275. Id. at 189.
276. In Barnes, the court made clear that “[a] funding recipient is generally on notice that it
is subject not only to those remedies explicitly provided in the relevant legislation, but also to
those traditionally available in breach of contract suits.” Id. at 187.
277. Id.
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to remedies traditionally available in breach of contract suits, which excludes
punitive damages.278
Despite the analysis set forth above, all courts of appeal that have
considered the issue of damages under Section 504 and the ADA have held
that compensatory damages are not available without a showing of intentional
discrimination.279 Recent examples can be seen in several cases before the
Third Circuit where plaintiffs brought claims of misidentification under both
Section 504 and the ADA but were dismissed for failure to plead facts
regarding intentional discrimination. Two of those cases are discussed below.
S.H. was an 18 year old African American female who was classified as
learning disabled in her fifth grade year while attending school in Lower
Merion School District.280 She was subsequently given learning supports in a
resource room as well as itinerant speech and language therapy. 281 S.H.
continued to receive special education services into high school and these
services at times conflicted with regular education courses. 282 Although
S.H.’s mother was an active participant in IEP meetings and approved the
special education classes, S.H., herself, did not believe she required special
education courses and objected to the classes.283 In her tenth-grade year,
S.H.’s mother requested and was granted an Independent Educational
Evaluation by a nationally certified school psychologist who was not
affiliated with the school district.284 This independent expert determined that
“S.H.’s designation as learning disabled was, and always had been,
erroneous.”285 Following the independent expert’s report, S.H.’s mother
requested that S.H. be removed from special education which the school
granted.286 S.H. subsequently filed a suit in federal court alleging: 1) the
school district violated IDEA’s mandate of accurate identifications of
children with disabilities, 2) the school district violated Section 504 and the
ADA by erroneously identifying S.H. as a student with disabilities and
278. Weber, supra note 220.
279. S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 261 (3d Cir. 2013); T.W.
ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cty., 610 F.3d 588, 603–04 (11th Cir. 2010); Loeffler v.
Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 582 F.3d 268, 275 (2d Cir. 2009); Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922,
938 (9th Cir. 2008); Nieves-Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 126 (1st Cir. 2003).
280. S.H., 729 F.3d at 252–53.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 255.
283. Id. at 251.
284. Id. at 254.
285. Id. The expert determined that the initial evaluation performed by the school
psychologist contained data that did not support the school’s conclusion that S.H. had a learning
disability. Id.
286. Id. at 255.
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discriminating against her because of her perceived disability. 287 S.H. sought
compensatory education and monetary damages in the amount of
$127,010.288
The district court dismissed the IDEA claim, holding that because S.H.
asserted that she is not disabled, she is not entitled to protection under the
IDEA.289 The court then granted summary judgement in the School District’s
favor for the Section 504 and ADA claims, holding that plaintiff must be able
to show evidence of intentional discrimination to sustain a claim for
compensatory damages under Section 504 or the ADA. 290 The court
characterized S.H.’s misidentification as “unfortunate,” but ultimately held
that “plaintiffs have not come forward with any evidence which would allow
a reasonable jury to find that the School District intentionally discriminated
against S.H. when it regarded her as disabled.”291 In a case of first impression,
the Third Circuit affirmed, stating, “[w]hile Appellants’ arguments are
emotionally compelling, they are ultimately to no avail.” 292
Like S.H., A.G. was an eighteen-year-old African-American female who
was classified as disabled in elementary school under the category of
“specific learning disability” and later in high school under the category of
“Other Health Impairment.”293 Due to this classification, she was placed in
special-education classes which, at times, preempted her from taking regular
courses. In her senior year of high school, A.G. filed a due process claim
under the IDEA alleging she was not disabled and that the school erroneously
identified her as such through incomplete and inaccurate evaluations which
resulted in a denial of FAPE. 294 And, similar to S.H., A.G. was told she had
no standing to invoke the IDEA’s procedural protections, because she was
not a “child with a disability.” 295 A.G. subsequently filed a claim in district
court alleging that the school district violated the Title II of the ADA and
Section 504 when it erroneously identified her as a student with a disability,
287. S.H. initially filed a due process request for an administrative hearing through the IDEA,
but this request was dismissed since the hearing officer determined that S.H. was not a “child with
a disability” and thus not entitled to IDEA protections. Id.
288. Plaintiff’s expert witness calculated damages by including two additional years of
college tuition, 50 hours of psychotherapy, and 600 hours of tutoring. Id.
289. Durrell ex rel. S.H. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., No. 10-6070, 2011 WL 2582147, at *3
(E.D. Pa. June 30, 2011).
290. Durrell ex rel. S.H. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., No. 10-6070, 2012 WL 2953956, at *8
(E.D. Pa. July 19, 2012).
291. Id.
292. S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 257 (3d Cir. 2013).
293. A.G. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 542 F. App’x 194, 196–97 (3d Cir. 2013).
294. Id. at 200.
295. Brief of Appellant, A.G. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 542 F. App’x 194 (3d Cir. 2013)
(No. 12-4029), 2013 WL 1623568, at *5.
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segregated her from the regular education classroom, and thus deprived her
of access to regular education.296 The defendant school district filed a motion
for summary judgment, which was granted by the district court, and
subsequently affirmed by the Third Circuit.
In both cases, the Third Circuit imposed an intent standard on the
plaintiffs’ claims for compensatory damages under Section 504 and Title II
of the ADA. In each case, the Court relied on the text of Section 504,
incorporating remedies in Title VI, as well as the Supreme Court’s decisions
in Guardians and Barnes as the basis for requiring intent in order to win
compensatory damages.297 The court cited to Barnes for confirmation that
Section 504 incorporated remedies available in Title VI and cited to
Guardians for the proposition that individuals who brought suit under Title
VI could not recover compensatory relief in the absence of a showing of
intentional discrimination.298 Based on this, the court extended Title VI’s
intent requirement to Section 504 and Title II of the ADA.299
This analysis, however, again treats Title VI, Section 504, and Title II of
the ADA as synonymous in all respects, when they are not. Choate explicitly
warned against doing exactly what the Third Circuit did: applying the
Guardians intent analysis to Section 504. An intent standard could potentially
be appropriate for Section 504 damage claims, but if it is, it is not because of
Guardians or any other Title VI precedent. Section 504’s reference to Title
VI’s remedies simply makes individual causes of action permissible and
injunctive and compensatory damages available. It does not make the
definition of prohibited and compensable disability discrimination dependent
on the definition of prohibited and compensable racial discrimination. When
courts, such as the Third Circuit, make this logical leap they cement an
unnecessary roadblock in the path of misidentified students seeking
compensatory relief under Section 504 and the ADA.

296. Complaint at 6–7, A.G. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., No. 11-5025, 2012 WL 4473244
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2012) (No. 11-5025), 2011 WL 9211059.
297. S.H., 729 F.3d at 261–63 (citing Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185 (2002);
Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 597 (1983)); A.G., 542 F. App’x
at 198.
298. S.H., 729 F.3d at 261.
299. Id. (“We therefore take the next logical step and hold that claims for compensatory
damages under § 504 of the RA and § 202 of the ADA also require a finding of intentional
discrimination.”)
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2. The Spending Clause Quagmire
If some level of intent is required for compensatory damages under
Section 504, the more likely rationale would be based on Spending Clause
doctrine. The Supreme Court has held that legislation enacted pursuant to
Congress’s spending clause powers is much like the nature of a contract, the
State agrees to comply with federal statutory terms in return for federal
funds.300
The legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the spending
power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly
accepts the terms of the “contract.” There can, of course, be no
knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or is
unable to ascertain what is expected of it.301

In other words, Congress cannot impose ambiguous obligations on the
state. The state must know about potential liability that arises upon receipt of
funds. Thus, the Court has held that to succeed in an implied private right of
action for compensatory damages under spending clause legislation, a
plaintiff must prove that the defendant was on notice of the statute’s
prohibitions, but violated them anyway. 302
Section 504 is spending clause legislation and thus may be subject to
spending clause jurisprudence.303 According to the Supreme Court, when
Congress legislates under its spending clause authority, it must do so
“unambiguously.”304 In other words, Congress must clearly set forth
conditions attached to federal money and states must “voluntarily and
knowingly accept[] the terms of the ‘contract.’”305 When a statute contains an
implied private right of action, such as Title VI and by extension Section 504,
the Court has held that states cannot realistically predict that they would be
subject to liability.306 Thus, to succeed on an implied private right of action,
plaintiffs must prove intent on the part of the defendant.307 This requirement
ensures that recipient, in deliberately violating the statute, has notice that this
conduct exposes him to liability. 308 The Supreme Court has held that

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
Id. (citation omitted).
Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 74 (1992); Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 25.
Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185–86 (2002).
Id. at 186.
Id.
Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 25; Buhai & Golden, supra note 220.
Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 51–52.
Id.; see also Buhai & Golden, supra note 220.
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“deliberate indifference” to a statute’s prohibitions is enough to satisfy the
notice requirement.309
Courts requiring an intent standard do so, in part, to ensure notice pursuant
to Spending Clause doctrine.310 However, per the Supreme Court in Choate,
Section 504, unlike Title VI and Title IX, prohibits a broader form of
discrimination which includes discriminatory effects such as lack of
meaningful access to a benefit.311 Thus, a state is on notice when accepting
funds that it will be liable for unintentional discrimination. To put it
differently, the state was aware that when it agreed to the “terms” of Section
504, it agreed to be on the hook for some unintentional forms of
discrimination. This unintentional discrimination is a violation of the statute.
Thus, the question is not whether the discrimination was intentional, but
whether the defendant was aware that it engaged in prohibited unintentional
discrimination and persisted in it anyway. The simplest example involves
reasonable accommodations. Section 504 clearly requires that recipients
make reasonable accommodations.312 Courts hearing reasonableaccommodations claims have held that plaintiffs do not need to prove intent
to win on a reasonable accodations claim.313 The act of not providing the
accommodation is a prohibited form of discrimination under the statute. This
analysis reinforces the Supreme Court’s spending clause jurisprudence. If the
state “voluntarily and knowingly” agreed to abide by a statute prohibiting
unintentional discrimination, then requiring plaintiff to prove an intentional
violation is unnecessary.
The difficulty arises in regard to defining the scope of unintentional
discrimination prohibited by Section 504. If that is not clear, it is more
difficult to conclude that a defendant has knowledge of a violation. Cases of
failures to reasonably accommodate are clearly within the scope, but other
types of disparate impacts are not so easily defined. While Choate indicates
that some disparate impacts violate Section 504, it is careful to indicate that
not all disparate impacts are violations. 314 Thus, the key to meeting any
potential intentional violation or notice standard for compensatory damages
under Section 504 would be some relatively bright line rules regarding the
309. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998) (finding that deliberate
indifference was required to establish claim for compensatory damages in Title IX case in the
absence of actual notice on part of school district to allegations of teacher’s sexual harassment of
student).
310. S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 264 (3d Cir. 2013).
311. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292 (1985).
312. Weber, supra note 226, at 618.
313. Bartlett v. N.Y. Dep’t of Law Exam’rs, 156 F.3d 321, 330 (2d Cir. 1998).
314. Choate, 469 U.S. at 299.
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disparate impacts and unintentional violations that defendants are obligated
to eliminate.
This same line of reasoning, however, does not follow for the ADA. The
ADA is not Spending Clause legislation. Rather, the ADA was enacted
pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and is mandatory on
states regardless of their receipt of federal funds. 315 This distinction makes
the intent and notice of disparate impact concerns irrelevant. The only
question would be whether the defendant has engaged in prohibited activity
under the ADA, which does not require any intent, only evidence of a
violation of the terms of the statute.316
In sum, the only instance in which intent is even arguably required is when
a plaintiff seeks compensatory damages. But even there, intent is not
obviously required. Title VI precedent does not require this result in regard
to Section 504 or the ADA. At best, Spending Clause principles require the
defendant to knowingly engage in the violation of the statute, but as
demonstrated throughout, a violation of Section 504 and the ADA can occur
without intent. In other words, at most, Spending Clause doctrine requires
that a defendant engage in activity that it knows violates the statute, such as
denial of reasonable accommodations. But again, a knowing violation would
be unnecessary to establish in regard to ADA claims because the ADA is not
Spending Clause legislation.
3.

Current Intent Standards for Compensatory Damages

Assuming that intent may sometimes be required when plaintiffs seek
compensatory damages at least with respect to Section 504, the question
remains as to what is the appropriate intent standard. It is a mistake to assume
that intent means the same thing across discrimination paradigms. As
discussed, race discrimination and disability discrimination are distinct. Both
Congress and courts have acknowledged that disability discrimination is
more often the product of benign neglect or ignorance than ill will.317 Moving
beyond the motivation behind discrimination, there are several other
important differences as well. First, unlike race, disability can actually affect
one’s ability to perform a job or participate in school.318 Race, on the other
315. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (2012) (stating the ADA’s purpose is “to invoke the sweep of
congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate
commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with
disabilities”); see also Buhai & Golden, supra note 220, at 1142.
316. Buhai & Golden, supra note 220, at 1142.
317. Choate, 469 U.S. at 299.
318. Buhai & Golden, supra note 220, at 1129.
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hand, is not itself a relevant factor in one’s ability to perform tasks or
participate equally in school. Second, one’s disability may not be as obvious
or readily apparent as one’s race or gender.319 Third, Section 504 prohibits
actions that have discriminatory effects, whereas Title VI is limited to
intentional discrimination.320
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, both disability rights statutes
require states to take affirmative actions in order to fulfill the antidiscrimination mandate. This affirmative obligation comes in more than one
form. One obligation is to provide “reasonable accommodations.”321 Another,
in the education context, is Section 504’s mandate that schools provide
“appropriate education” defined as “meeting the educational needs of
disabled students as adequately as the needs of nondisabled students.”322 Title
VI has no comparative obligations. Thus, disability discrimination can mean
failing to carry out one’s affirmative obligation to provide reasonable
accommodations or appropriate education, whereas race discrimination is
typically construed as intentionally choosing to inflict harm or deny benefits
based on race. This affirmative obligation distinction becomes essential in
determining an appropriate intent standard that triggers compensatory
damages for violations of Section 504 and Title II of the ADA.
Currently, courts lack any uniform approach to defining intent
requirements in disability, but most agree that the test is something less than
the discriminatory animus that is generally required to establish intent under
Title VI. The majority of circuits hearing Section 504 and ADA cases for
compensatory damages require plaintiffs to demonstrate intent in one of two
ways, either by establishing “deliberate indifference” or “bad faith, gross
misjudgment” on the part of the defendant. Only one circuit has held that the
higher standard of discriminatory animus is required.323 Each will be
discussed in detail below.

319. See Jane Byeff Korn, Cancer and the ADA: Rethinking Disability, 74 S. CAL. L. REV.
399 (2001) (discussing the distinctions in race or gender discrimination as opposed to disability
discrimination. In the first two categories, people are discriminated against because of their
membership in a group; however, people with disabilities are not as readily identifiable as one
uniform group and can experience individualized discrimination based on a typical type of
disability.).
320. See supra Section III.C.3.
321. Weber, supra note 226, at 618.
322. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a)(b) (2010).
323. Carter v. Orleans Par. Pub. Sch., 725 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1984). But see Nieves–Marquez
v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 126 (1st Cir. 2003) (hinting that intent as required under Sandoval,
would be imposed in that circuit on Section 504 claims for compensatory damages).
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Discriminatory animus is the most stringent standard of intent. It requires
the plaintiff to prove that defendant acted with “prejudice, spite or ill will.”324
It is the standard the Supreme Court has imposed on plaintiffs seeking to
establish violations of Title VI. 325 In such cases, plaintiff must prove that
defendant’s actions were motivated by race. “It implies that the
decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least
in part ‘because of’, not merely ‘in spite of’ its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group.”326 The Fifth Circuit found that discriminatory animus is
the appropriate standard for compensatory damages in Section 504 and ADA
cases and relied on Title VI as the basis for imposing this standard. 327 Most
other courts of appeal have declined to apply the animus standard because of
the fundamental differences between race discrimination and disability
discrimination. Instead, they opt for different standards which still require
plaintiffs prove “something more” than a mere violation of Section 504 or the
ADA, but do not force plaintiffs to demonstrate ill will.
A second, slightly-lower intent standard imposed by several circuits is
“bad faith or gross misjudgment.” Here, plaintiff must prove that defendant
grossly departed from acceptable professional standards when seeking
compensatory damages.328 Courts using this standard generally require a
showing of aggravated circumstances beyond a mere violation of the
requirements of Section 504 or the ADA. 329 Generally negligence or statutory
noncompliance in and of themselves do not constitute bad faith or gross
misjudgment.330 However, evidence of ill will or animosity is not necessarily
required to meet the standard.331 The Eighth Circuit first raised this standard

324. Liese v. Indian River Cty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334, 344 (11th Cir. 2012).
325. See supra Section III.B. and accompanying discussion of Title VI.
326. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
327. Carter, 725 F.2d at 264.
328. Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d 1164, 1170 (8th Cir. 1982).
329. B.M. ex rel. Miller v. S. Callaway R-II Sch. Dist., 732 F.3d 882, 887 (8th Cir. 2013);
see also Sellers ex rel. Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of City of Manassas, Va., 141 F.3d 524, 529 (4th Cir.
1998).
330. B.M., 732 F.3d at 887.
331. “Under some circumstances, notice of a student’s disability coupled with delay in
implementing accommodations can show bad faith or gross misjudgment.” B.M., 732 F.3d at 888;
see also M.P. ex rel. K. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 721, 326 F.3d 975, 982–83 (8th Cir.2003) (parents
of a child with schizophrenia who had received accommodations alleged a Section 504 violation
when the school failed to take appropriate steps to address harassment by other students once his
disability was made public, the court found that summary judgment was inappropriate because
bad faith or gross misjudgment could be inferred from the school’s failure to return the mother’s
phone calls to discuss the harassment, its offer of inadequate accommodations to address the
harassment, and the rescission of an offer to pay for transportation costs).
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in Monahan v. Nebraska,332 a case concerning the provision of special
education services.333 There, the court stated in dicta, “[m]anifestly, in order
to show violation of the Rehabilitation Act, something more than a mere
failure to provide the ‘free appropriate education’ required by the [IDEA]
must be shown.”334 However, courts should be exceedingly cautious about
continuing to impose this standard in the context of education cases as several
interceding legislative and judicial developments call into question its
continued appropriateness.
First, as Professor Mark Weber aptly points out, the Monahan language
originated at a time when courts were trying to reconcile the IDEA and
Section 504 due to a belief that the IDEA preempted remedies available in
Section 504.335 At that time, courts felt that plaintiffs could not use the same
facts to establish violations of both the IDEA and Section 504. Thus, in order
to state a case under Section 504, courts required plaintiffs to prove
“something more” than violations of the IDEA. 336 In 1986, Congress
amended the IDEA to include language clarifying that the IDEA should not
be read to “restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available
under the Constitution, ADA, [Section 504], or other Federal laws protecting
the rights of children with disabilities . . . .”337 Consequently, the need to
harmonize Section 504 with the IDEA became moot as plaintiffs were
expressly permitted to seek redress under both statutes for the same
underlying allegations. Second, some courts have called into question
Monahan’s continued relevance in light of the Supreme Court’s clarity in
Choate affirming that Section 504 does require reasonable accommodations
and prohibits some forms of unintentional discrimination.338 They correctly
332. Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d 1164, 1170 (8th Cir. 1982).
333. Id. at 1167.
334. Id. at 1170 (emphasis added).
335. Weber, supra note 220, at 1456–58.
336. Id. at 1458.
337. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2012). The section does impose an exhaustion requirement when
a plaintiff is seeking relief that is the same under either statute. In those cases, plaintiff must
exhaust IDEA remedies before filing suit under another federal statute based on the same facts.
However, as most courts have found that the IDEA does not allow for compensatory damages,
plaintiffs seeking such damages are generally able to bring an IDEA claim at the as well as Section
504 and ADA claims together. See generally Sellers ex rel. Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of City of
Manassas, Va., 141 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 1998); Pasachoff, supra note 107.
338. In A.P. ex rel. Peterson v. Anoka-Hennepin Independent School District No. 11, the
court declined to follow the “bad faith or gross misjudgment” standard in a reasonable
accommodations claim for compensatory damages, calling into question its continued relevancy.
538 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1145 (D. Minn. 2008). The court pointed out that Monahan relied on
language from a previous Supreme Court case, Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442
U.S. 397 (1979), asserting Section 504 is not “an affirmative-action statute.” Id. at 1146. The
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point out that the Monahan standard was developed at a time when many
thought that Section 504 did not necessarily mandate affirmative action in the
form of reasonable accommodations.339 It has since become clear that Section
504 does require states to take affirmative actions in the form of reasonable
accommodations.340 Finally, since Monahan, new jurisprudence surrounding
Spending Clause legislation has developed. At the heart is the Supreme
Court’s holding that when Congress legislates via its powers under the
Spending Clause, it must be clear and unambiguous in its terms.341 One way
to ensure states are aware of conditions imposed by Spending Clause
legislation, and subsequent violation of conditions, is by requiring notice. 342
The “bad faith or gross misjudgment” standard does not contain an element
of notice and thus may be a poor fit for finding liability, at least as it relates
to Section 504, which is Spending Clause legislation.343 Despite this new
clarity, many courts continue to impose the “bad faith or gross misjudgment”
standard on plaintiffs seeking compensatory damages under Section 504 and
Title II of the ADA and with it create unnecessary obstacles on plaintiffs
seeking relief for clear violations of the law.344
The final standard of intent courts use in Section 504 and Title II cases
involving education is “deliberate indifference.” Courts imposing the
deliberate indifference standard generally acknowledge the disability-race
distinction and the fact that both disability statutes are focused on addressing
court in Monahan interpreted that as meaning the statute did not require affirmative action by the
school in order to fulfill its mandate. Id. However, in Alexander v. Choate, the Court clarified
what it meant was that states were not required to take “affirmative action” to make changes or
modifications that would be “substantial” or constitute “fundamental [alterations] in the nature of
the program . . . .” Id. Rather, Section 504 only required those accommodations that were
“reasonable.” Id. (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300 n.20 (1985)).
339. Choate, 469 U.S. at 300 n.20.
340. Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 274 (3d Cir. 2014).
341. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002).
342. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998).
343. Barnes, 536 U.S. at 190 n.3.
344. See generally M.Y. ex rel. J.Y. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 544 F.3d 885 (8th Cir. 2008);
Birmingham v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 220 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff could not recover
damages under section 504 or the ADA where school graduated plaintiff early without prior notice
to her mother); Sellers ex rel. Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of Manassas, 141 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 1998) (high
school student and his parents could not recover compensatory or punitive damages for alleged
violations of IDEA and section 504 based on school officials’ failure to diagnose student’s
learning disabilities); K.D. ex rel. J.D. v. Starr, 55 F. Supp. 3d 782 (D. Md. 2014); D.L. v. District
of Columbia, 730 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D.D.C. 2010); D.A. v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 716 F. Supp. 2d
603 (S.D. Tex. 2009), aff’d, 629 F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 2010) (disabled student’s parent failed to
demonstrate that school district acted with bad faith or gross misjudgment when it failed to timely
identify student for special education services, as required to prevail on her claim for violation of
ADA and RA).
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“more subtle forms of discrimination” than “obviously exclusionary
conduct.”345 In order to prove the defendant acted with deliberate
indifference, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant 1) knew that
harm to a federally protected right was substantially likely, and 2) failed to
act on that likelihood.346 Courts have made clear that this standard does not
call for mere negligence or failure to act, but rather requires a “deliberate
choice . . . rather than negligence or bureaucratic inaction.”347
In discussing its decision to adopt the deliberate indifference standard for
Section 504 and ADA claims, the Third Circuit relied on two conclusions: 1)
disability discrimination is often rooted in different motivations than race
discrimination and 2) notice is required because Section 504 is Spending
Clause legislation.348 For the first proposition, the Third Circuit reasoned that
the deliberate-indifference standard would target neglect of the disabled as
opposed to ill will or hatred better than an animus standard would.349
Regarding the Spending Clause restriction, the Court determined deliberate
indifference would adequately fulfill notice concerns raised by Spending
Clause legislation.350
345. Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 944–45 (9th Cir. 2011).
346. S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 265 (3d Cir. 2013); Liese
v. Indian River Cty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334, 344 (11th Cir. 2012); Duvall v. Cty. of Kitsap,
260 F.3d 1124, 1139 (9th Cir. 2001).
347. Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 193 (2d Cir. 2007). The Supreme Court has
described deliberate indifference as a “stringent standard of fault . . . .” Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). “A showing of simple or even heightened negligence will not
suffice” to establish deliberate indifference. Id. at 407. Rather, a defendant is deliberately
indifferent only if he acts with “conscious disregard” for a plaintiff’s rights. Id. Such conscious
disregard exists only if either (1) the defendant actually knows that its actions will violate the
plaintiff’s rights or (2) such a violation is the “plainly obvious consequence” of the defendant’s
actions. Id. at 410–12.
348. S.H., 729 F.3d at 264. The Court incorrectly characterizes the ADA as Spending Clause
legislation. The ADA was not enacted under the Spending Clause, but draws its authority through
the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (2012); see also
Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 190 n.3 (2002).
349. S.H., 729 F.3d at 264.
350. There remains a question about whether the Spending Clause restriction on notice
applies to Section 504. The Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the issue. The Court has ruled
that notice is required under Spending Clause legislation, the key being, “[t]he legitimacy of
Congress’s power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily
and knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). Accordingly, if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of
federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously. Arguably, Section 504, unlike Title VI and Title
IX, prohibits unintentional discrimination. Thus, a state is on notice when accepting funds that it
will be liable for unintentional discrimination. Further, unlike Title IX, courts have permitted
respondeat superior liability in section 504 cases consistent with unintentional liability. See, e.g.,
Weber, supra note 220.
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When applying a deliberate indifference standard to a misidentification
case, it is easy to see how plaintiffs may face an uphill battle in establishing
the requisite intent. One court required a misidentified plaintiff to plead facts
which demonstrated: 1) the school had “knowledge that [the plaintiff] was
likely not disabled and therefore should not have been in special education,”
and 2) failure to act despite that knowledge.351 The plaintiff’s assertions that
she put the school on notice by telling teachers she was not disabled and
scoring near average on standardized tests, were not enough to establish
notice under prong one of the deliberate indifference test.352 Thus, the court
did not reach analysis under the second prong of the deliberate-indifference
standard.
Framed in this way, deliberate indifference is almost as difficult a standard
to meet as discriminatory animus. It requires knowledge on the part of the
defendant that the plaintiff is likely not a child with a disability, and despite
this knowledge, a decision to treat the child as disabled. In fact, adopting the
deliberate-indifference standard leads to perverse and anomalous results.
Recall that schools are tasked with additional obligations to ensure students
with eligible disabilities have equal educational opportunities. Students with
eligible disabilities are entitled to FAPE, reasonable accommodations, and
will have procedural due-process rights to enforce their claims. It is difficult
to imagine a scenario in which a school would knowingly misidentify a child
for disabilities thereby exposing themselves to more liability. In fact, schools
readily concede that plaintiff-students are not disabled in misidentification
cases so that they can escape liability. 353 Given this dynamic, it seems
illogical to frame the “deliberate indifference” standard so narrowly. Rather,
when courts analyze claims using deliberate indifference, they should seek to
reconcile a school’s affirmative obligations under the statutes with the intent
351. S.H., 729 F.3d at 265.
352. The Appellate Court held that S.H.’s personal feelings about not needing special
education did not constitute notice to the school of a lack of disability, particularly when her
mother consented to special education placement. Id. at 266. With regard to the independent
expert evaluations, the court held that because the reports were made subsequent to the school’s
evaluation, they have no bearing on whether or not the school knew at the time of its decision to
place S.H. in special education, that the school’s diagnosis was wrong. Id. at 267. Further, the
court held that liability under the deliberate indifference standard is not dependent on whether the
school erred in its psychological evaluation of S.H., “evidence that the School District may have
been wrong about S.H.’s diagnosis is not evidence that the School District had knowledge that it
was a wrong diagnosis.” Id. at 266. Finally, the court found unpersuasive evidence of S.H.’s test
scores because scores indicated she performed well in some areas and below average in others
and there was no evidence in the record indicating that high test scores are an indicator of no
learning disability. Id. at 266–67.
353. S.H., 729 F.3d at 256; A.G. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 542 F. App’x 194, 198 (3d Cir.
2013). In both cases the school did not contest that plaintiffs were not disabled.
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standard. The following section will discuss an alternative way to analyze
deliberate indifference in misidentification cases.
C.

An Alternate Analysis of Intent under Section 504 and Title II of
ADA

Plaintiffs claiming they were wrongly identified as disabled do not easily
fit in any of the current categories of education-based disability claims.
Generally, in the education context, plaintiffs’ claims are based on intentional
discrimination, disparate impact, failure to make reasonable
accommodations, or failure to provide FAPE.354 Violations in the latter two
categories represent failure by the school to carry out an affirmative duty. At
first blush, the misidentified student’s claim may look like an intentional
discrimination claim. The student is claiming a school intentionally
discriminated against her because of a perceived disability. However, the
school’s discrimination would be permissible if the student was disabled, and
in fact the school engaged in the discrimination based on the perceived
disability. Thus, in this context, the discrimination based on disability is,
arguably, permissible. At heart, a misidentification claim does not center
around impermissible discrimination, but rather represents a school’s failure
to carry out an affirmative obligation, and courts should analyze them as such.
The crux of a misidentified student’s claim is the inaccurate identification
and classification of the student as disabled. Schools are obligated under
Section 504 and Title II of the ADA to identify and assess students for
disabilities. Thus, the central question is at what point does a school become
liable for compensatory damages when it gets this identification wrong? The
school’s failure to accurately identify the student led to a denial of
educational opportunity. Assuming intent is required for compensatory
damages, and assuming “deliberate indifference” is the appropriate level of
intent that accomplishes the goal of providing notice for Spending Clause
legislation, how should courts analyze misidentification claims in this context
to determine whether a school appropriately fulfilled its obligation of
accurate identification under Section 504 and Title II of the ADA?
Section 504 and Title II of the ADA both obligate schools to find students
with potential disabilities and evaluate them using valid tests, administered
by professionals, assessing specific areas of educational need rather than a
general intelligence quotient.355 Schools are, or should be, aware of these
354. 1 THOMAS R. TRENKNER, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: PRACTICE & COMPLIANCE
MANUAL § 2:199 (2016).
355. 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.32(a), 104.35(b)(1)(2) (2016).
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requirements, which are clearly set forth in the statutes’ regulations.356
Schools agree to abide by Section 504’s requirements when they accept
Federal dollars for their special education costs and are obligated to abide by
the ADA’s requirements.357 In other words, the obligation to accurately
identify children with disabilities is clear and unambiguous.
Currently, courts analyzing misidentification cases have held that
plaintiffs must demonstrate a school had knowledge that the child was likely
not disabled to establish the first prong of deliberate indifference—
knowledge that harm to a federally protected right was substantially likely. 358
However, courts fail to consider the statutes’ affirmative obligations—
mandating accurate identification of disability—as a part of this analysis. In
other words, an argument could be made that since Section 504 and Title II
require certain standards and protocols to ensure accurate disability
evaluations, violations of these standards, could rise to the level of a
deliberate or intentional act. Again, the school is aware of these standards as
encompassed in regulations, and thus, a decision to flout them should be
viewed as an intentional act.
Against this backdrop, a misidentified plaintiff could establish intent by
demonstrating that the school failed to use valid tests,359 failed to ensure the
tests were administered by professionals, or failed to assess all appropriate
areas of educational need. These are all express directives contained in
Section 504 regulations. A school’s choice to use incorrect or incomplete
protocols to evaluate students is something more than negligence. It is a direct
violation of the regulations that the school agreed to – a direct violation of
their contract with the federal government. In other words, when schools
intentionally conduct incomplete and inaccurate evaluations in direct
contradiction of the terms set forth in the Section 504 and the ADA, schools
are on notice that this action makes it substantially likely they are violating a
federally-protected right.
If courts were to apply such an analysis it would ensure that schools are
held accountable for clear violations of federally protected rights while at the
same time, guarding against imposition of unfair burdens on schools. To
make this point more clearly, it is useful to apply the above framework to
356. Id.
357. See supra Section IV.B.2.
358. S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 265 (3d Cir. 2013); A.G.
v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 542 F. App’x 194, 198 (3d Cir. 2013).
359. Validity is the extent to which a test accurately measures what it purports to measure.
See generally Samuel Messick, Validity of Psychological Assessment: Validation of Inferences
from Persons’ Responses and Performances as Scientific Inquiry into Score Meaning, 50 AM.
PSYCHOL. 741 (1995), http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.50.9.741.
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S.H. and A.G. Recall that both S.H. and A.G. alleged defects in their initial
evaluations and reevaluations, which amounted to a failure to comply with
professional standards, including the failure to observe plaintiffs in the
classroom, which the school district conceded was required by the IDEA.360
The Court should have started from the premise that the school had
knowledge of professional standards with regards to disability assessments.
Failure to abide by these standards could amount to an intentional act—an
intentional violation of the terms of the agreement. Because of this intentional
violation, the school was on notice of “harm to a federally protected right.”
This analysis stays true to the obligation schools enter into when accepting
funds from the federal government and prevents schools from escaping
liability when they do not fulfill these obligations. In order to protect against
liability, a school must ensure that it follows the terms set forth in the Section
504 and the ADA, which is something they already agreed to do. Thus, courts
are not imposing undue burdens on schools.
1. The Parental Consent Trap
Courts must also re-frame their current analysis surrounding parental
consent in the context of misidentification cases. When defending
misidentification claims, schools may argue that the parent consented to the
special education label and services. Schools maintain that parental consent
immunizes the school from any wrongdoing. In S.H., the school district
successfully advanced such a defense, arguing that mother’s consent to her
daughter’s diagnosis and subsequent services estopped her from now
claiming those services were unwanted.361 However, parents, and particularly
poor parents, are significantly disadvantaged when negotiating with schools
in the context of special education services.362 The imbalance of power,
information, and resources, all in favor of the school, combine to place
parents in a wholly inferior bargaining position. Thus, parents’ consent to a
360. 34 C.F.R. §300.310(b)(2) (2016); Reply Brief of Appellants at 22 ,24, 25, S.H. ex rel.
Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2013) (No. 12-3264), 2013 WL
523723; see supra Section IV.E.3. The IDEA requires that at least one member of the evaluation
team who was not the child’s regular classroom teacher conduct an observation of the child’s
academic performance in the regular classroom as part of the evaluation and eligibility
determination process. A.G. introduced evidence which indicated that the school failed to conduct
classroom observations as required by the IDEA, and incorrectly interpreted test results finding
no conclusive basis for the diagnosis of “specific learning disability” based on the test scores.
A.G., 542 F. App’x at 200.
361. S.H., 729 F.3d at 266.
362. Caruso, supra note 2, at 180–81; Hyman et al., supra note 60, at 140–45; Pasachoff,
supra note 107, at 1436.
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disability label should not prevent them from a later attempt to hold schools
accountable for inaccurate identifications.
The IDEA requires schools to include parents in the planning and decision
making process surrounding their child’s education.363 Parents are required to
give consent for their child to be evaluated for disabilities, must be present at
the IEP meeting, and must consent to any and all services that are to be put
in place to address a child’s needs.364 Although parents are ensured a seat at
the table, there remains an unequal balance of power at these meetings.365 For
instance, the school’s expert—generally a school psychologist—is the person
who has conducted the evaluation and presents this information to the team.
Parents, who are often unfamiliar with the various types of testing protocols,
rely on the expert for guidance in interpreting results of their child’s
performance on evaluations. Likewise, parents rely on the school
psychologist as well as teacher observations of their child and assessment of
their child’s performance in comparison to peers. This is all information that
the parent cannot otherwise get.366 When presented with the expert’s opinion,
one can see why a parent, lacking a depth of knowledge of the expert, would
rely on that opinion. Further, schools have an independent obligation to
ensure accuracy in disability identification and evaluation.367 This obligation
exists whether or not parents ultimately consent to disability classification
and services. Schools should not be permitted to insulate themselves from
liability for inaccurate evaluations through parental consent. This puts an
undue burden on parents to have the requisite knowledge needed to challenge
expert analysis of assessment tools used to measure disability as well as the
technical requirements contained in state regulations enforcing the IDEA.
At least one court has rejected a school’s claim that parental consent to a
diagnosis acted as a bar to subsequent parent initiated action against the
school. In Draper v. Atlanta Independent School System,368 the parents filed
suit claiming that the school had misidentified their son as intellectually
disabled when he was actually learning disabled.369 The school tried to claim
that the family should have known about the misdiagnosis much earlier and
that the statute of limitations prevented the family from now bringing the
363. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B) (2016).
364. § 1414(a)(1)(D).
365. Caruso, supra note 2, at 174, 179; Pasachoff, supra note 107, at 1474.
366. Scholars also point how the confidentiality of disability in general makes it difficult for
parents to determine how other similarly situated children have been treated by the school,
including what types of assessments they may have undergone, services they have been offered,
and results of those services. Caruso, supra note 2; Pasachoff, supra note 107.
367. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2).
368. Draper v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 518 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2008).
369. Id. at 1281.
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claim.370 The Eleventh Circuit, appropriately rejected this argument holding,
“[w]e decline the invitation of the School System to conclude, as a matter of
law, that the Draper family should be blamed for not being experts about
learning disabilities.”371 Thus, the court correctly placed the burden on the
school to ensure accurate evaluation of the child.
V.
th

CONCLUSION

2015 marked 40 anniversary of the IDEA. In the decades since its
enactment, countless improvements have been made to improve educational
outcomes for students with disabilities. But at the same time, the
disproportionate classification of minority students that plagued the statute at
its inception continues to trouble educators and advocates forty years later.
Perpetuating a status quo in which schools are free to inaccurately identify
students as disabled, causing educational harms without fear of liability, only
exacerbates this entrenched problem. Until schools feel pressure to ensure
accuracy in their identification of disabilities, they will continue to use special
education as a dumping ground for “difficult” children. By leveraging
disability discrimination statutes, misidentified minority plaintiffs can hold
schools accountable, forcing them to ensure racially unbiased evaluations and
accuracy in identification of disabilities. Narrowing the entry point into
special education may also incentivize schools to find ways to address unmet
educational needs in the general education classroom rather than relying on
special education to solve these challenges.

370. Id. at 1287–88.
371. Id. at 1288.

